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Abstract 
A link between repeated subconcussive impact exposure (SIE) and long-term impairments has 
been established, initiating research on these repetitive impacts in athletics. This literature has 
revealed that accumulated asymptomatic injury is associated with cognitive, behavioural, and 
emotional challenges, as well as severe neurodegeneration, such as Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy (CTE; Stern et al., 2011). Moreover, after mild head injuries (MHI), individuals 
are often characterized as self-centered, inappropriate, and insensitive, demonstrating profound 
social challenges and an inability to adopt others’ mental states or a lack of what is known as 
theory of mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Bellerose, Bernier, Beaudoin, Gravel, 
& Beauchamp, 2015). Despite this, the socioemotional outcomes following repeated SIE remain 
poorly understood.  
ToM can be differentiated into its affective and cognitive components which are thought 
to be subserved by distinct neural regions. In particular, affective ToM has been linked to 
activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Leopold et al., 2012) – an area that is 
highly afflicted by subconcussive impacts (Bigler & Orrison, 2001). Damage to the vmPFC is 
associated with decreased physiological arousal and impaired social decision-making in MHI 
participants but it is unclear if SIE produces a similar profile (vanNoordt & Good, 2011). The 
aim of the current study was to investigate ToM after repetitive SIE, using a SIE composite 
derived from self-reported athletic history. Participants with varying levels of SIE were 
compared across a number of ToM assessments (capturing both affective and cognitive ToM), 
physiological measures, and neuropsychological tests. Although greater SIE was not associated 
with deficits in ToM performance, it was found to be predictive of physiological underarousal. 
Likewise, MHI status and severity were associated with reduced arousal reflecting a lack of 
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somatic cues that indicate that a response is socially unacceptable and, in turn, impairing 
affective ToM reasoning.  
Interestingly, traditional ToM measures, such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Davis, 1980) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), were found to lack specificity when examining ToM deficits in 
a competent university population. These findings imply that previous research demonstrating 
ToM impairments after moderate-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI; see Martin-Rodríguez & 
León-Carrión, 2010 for a review) may be capturing deficits in other domains and should be 
interpreted with caution. Taken together, the results from this research indicate that the 
investigation of physiological mechanisms may contribute to understanding of the 
neurodegenerative process following accumulated trauma in sports and help identify those at risk 
of social challenges. 
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Exploring Theory of Mind Following Repetitive Subconcussive Impact Exposure 
As the leading cause of death and disability of Canadians under 40 years of age (Kraus, 
1996), head injury is a growing public health concern. Each year in the United States traumatic 
brain injuries (TBIs) result in 235,000 hospitalizations, 1.1 million emergency department visits, 
and 50,000 deaths (Corrigan, Selassie, & Orman, 2010). This places a sizable strain on medical 
resources resulting in an estimated $125 million in direct costs and a three times greater amount 
in indirect costs each year (Angus et al., 1998). Moreover, as a chronic condition, brain injury is 
linked to a number of costly social and health issues (Anderson, Brown, Newitt, & Hoile, 2009); 
as many as 30% of children with learning disabilities (Max et al., 2004), 53% of homeless 
individuals (Hwang et al., 2008), and 82% of prison inmates (Wald, Helgeson, & Langlois, 
2008) are living with a brain injury. Persistent pain, anxiety and depression are commonly 
experienced following TBI (Larsson, Björkdahl, Esbjörnsson, & Sunnerhagen, 2013), as few 
individuals regain pre-morbid responsibilities and participation levels. In fact, data reveal that 
24% of Ontarians living with a TBI are not satisfied with their ability to independently engage in 
the community, 31% are not satisfied with their ability to develop and maintain new friendships, 
and 87% are currently unemployed (Ontario Brain Injury Association, 2012) – thus, the profound 
social and economic ramifications of TBI are evident.  
Despite the tremendous impact of TBI in general, the majority of all head injuries 
sustained – approximately 70 to 90% – are classified as mild in nature (McKinlay, et al., 2008). 
According to Canadian estimates, this represents between 493 and 653 mild traumatic brain 
injury (mTBI) cases per 100,000 population each year (Ryu, Feinstein, Colantonio, Streiner, & 
Dawson, 2009); and in the United States, as high as 500 cases per 100,000 (Bazarian et al., 
2005). While these rates are staggering, they do not capture the full magnitude of the problem. 
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Substantial variability in research methodology across settings and researchers makes it difficult 
to obtain similar prevalence estimates (Iverson & Lange, 2009). For instance, a number of 
compatible terms are used to refer to mTBI, including concussion, minor head injury, and mild 
head injury (MHI; Voss, Connolly, Schwab, & Scher, 2015). For the purposes of this study, the 
term mild head injury (MHI) is employed and is considered synonymous with the above terms. 
The present study defines a MHI as a closed head injury caused by any biomechanical force (to 
the head or torso) that results in a disruption of brain function, which is associated with any loss 
of consciousness (< 30 minutes in duration), memory (< 24 hours in duration), and/or alteration 
in mental state (Kay et al., 1993). This designation has been accepted by the American College 
of Rehabilitation Medicine (ACRM) and can be effectively captured through self-report. 
Making a formal MHI diagnosis is considerably challenging, given that current methods 
predominantly rely on clinicians’ assessments of reported symptoms. In early reports, a loss of 
consciousness was required for a head injury diagnosis (Von Holst & Cassidy, 2004); however, it 
is now accepted that injury can occur without a loss of consciousness and standardized criteria 
have been established (McCrory et al., 2013). Despite this, the classification of head injury 
severity still varies across settings and researchers/practitioners in the field. For example, the 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) is a common score-based measure 
employed to rapidly distinguish between mild, moderate, and severe injuries through a brief 
mental status exam. Alternatively, others utilize structural neuroimaging findings (e.g., the 
Abbreviated Injury Severity Scale [AIS]), loss and/or alteration of consciousness, and/or 
posttraumatic amnesia (Bigler & Orrison, 2001; Iverson & Lange, 2009) and establish cutoff 
values for different grades of severity (e.g., posttraumatic amnesia [PTA]: 0-1 day [mild], >1 to 
≤7 days [moderate], >7 days [severe]; Rimel, Giordani, Barth, & Jane, 1982). In addition, these 
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classification systems are associated with different methods of measurement (e.g., self-report 
scales, clinical interviews, observational research, etc.; Voss et al., 2015), which further 
contributes to inconsistencies among prevalence estimates.   
In the clinical literature, estimates are frequently based on descriptive analyses of hospital 
records; a substantial proportion of MHIs, however, do not receive medical attention (Corrigan, 
et al., 2010). Indeed, research demonstrates that 31% of individuals who indicate that they have 
sustained a MHI also report that they did not receive medical attention and 60% report that they 
did not complete medical documentation and/or were not admitted to a hospital (Templer et al., 
1992). Likewise, Segalowitz and Lawson (1995) revealed that approximately 80% of university 
students who report a history of MHI also state that they were not admitted to a hospital for their 
injury. Consequently, undocumented MHIs are excluded from clinical estimates, resulting in 
conservative accounts that considerably understate the true prevalence of these subtle injuries. 
Research in the Brock University Neuropsychology Cognitive Research (NCR) Lab has 
attempted to overcome this issue by using self-report methods and this liberal approach has 
yielded higher approximations (e.g., Baker & Good, 2014; vanNoordt & Good, 2011). Indeed, 
Baker and Good (2014) found that 56% of the 91 participants sampled reported a history of 
MHI. Similarly, by using a variety of information sources and addressing all levels of severity 
(i.e., both those who were and were not hospitalized), the Brain Injury Outcomes New Zealand 
In the Community (BIONIC) study documented 749 cases of MHI per 100,000 persons (Feigin 
et al., 2013) indicating that the true incidence of MHI is greater than that reported in 
investigations using strict medical criteria.  
Regardless of the terminology and diagnostic criteria used, the high prevalence of MHI is 
undeniable. With a range of aetiologies, including sports, accidental falls, and motor vehicle 
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collisions, an enormous proportion of individuals have been affected by MHI (Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research, 2006; Cassidy et al., 2004). Increased awareness and 
improvements in MHI classification have made it increasingly more common for individuals to 
seek assistance and receive a professional diagnosis of MHI (Rosenthal, Foraker, Collins, & 
Comstock, 2014). In the years to come, advances in injury-related biomarkers and neuroimaging 
techniques will lead to greater consistency in the field. For instance, recent work by Daley and 
colleagues (2016) suggests that a simple blood test may be used as a diagnostic tool for MHI in 
the near future. By measuring a pattern of 20 - 40 metabolites – molecules originating from 
bioactive substances produced by metabolic activity of the body – the Western University 
researchers have identified a distinct metabolite profile in concussed athletes. Although this 
research is preliminary, such advances offer greater sensitivity in the diagnosis of MHI and will 
likely facilitate agreement among future epidemiological reports (Voss et al., 2015).  
Head Injury in Sports 
Athletic populations are particularly vulnerable to MHI. According to reports by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an estimated 1.6 to 3.8 million sports-related 
concussions occur each year in the United States, which captures close to 30% of all MHIs 
sustained among youth (Langlois, Rutland-Brown & Wald, 2006). Moreover, from 2005 to 2012, 
MHI in high school sports increased from 0.23 to 0.51 per 1000 athlete exposures (AE; i.e., 
participation in a single practice or game; Rosenthal et al., 2014) leading some to suggest that the 
rate of MHI in sports is on the rise (CDC, 2011); however, it remains unclear whether this 
increase is the result of greater education and awareness surrounding MHI which has, in turn, 
facilitated increased reporting.  
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From a research perspective, athletic populations offer many advantages over standard 
control group or normative samples. By providing a targeted period of time during which injuries 
are sustained (e.g., over a single season of play) and age-matched non-concussed controls, sports 
have become instrumental in understanding the effects of MHI (McCrea, 2008). In particular, the 
Sport as a Laboratory Assessment Model (SLAM) proposed by Barth (1989) outlines the utility 
of conducting research in athletic settings. First, Barth’s model acknowledges the advantages of 
baseline and post-injury assessments as they allow for intra-individual comparisons (i.e., pre-
season vs. post-season neurocognitive assessments). Second, athletic games and practices are 
typically attended by medical professionals and/or athletic trainers increasing the likelihood of 
MHI diagnosis and greater documentation of injury characteristics. Lastly, the model facilitates 
greater understanding of the biomechanics of injury as sport impacts can be recreated in the 
laboratory based on video records of games and in-helmet recording technology (McCrea, 2008). 
SLAM has become widely implemented and has contributed significantly to the field of brain 
injury; notably, sports have shed light on the insidious nature of accumulated asymptomatic 
trauma (i.e., subconcussions) which serve as the focus of this paper.  
Epidemiology of Sports-Related MHI 
As with MHI in general, prevalence estimates of sports-related MHI must be interpreted 
carefully. To begin, the incidence and risk of MHI varies significantly across sports. Athletes 
who engage in “high-risk sports” (e.g., ice hockey, football, cheerleading, etc.) are most 
vulnerable to injury and sustain a greater number of MHIs than their “low-risk sport” 
counterparts (e.g., golf, tennis, swimming, etc.; Broglio, et al., 2014; Killam, Cautin, & Santucci, 
2005; McAllister et al., 2012). For instance, in Marar, McIlvain, Fields, & Comstock’s (2012) 
investigation of 20 high school sports, participation in boys’ football accounted for the majority 
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of reported concussions (47.1%), while low-risk sports, such as girls’ basketball and boys’ 
baseball, accounted for significantly fewer (5.5% and 1.2% respectively). Contrary to 
expectations, the majority of concussions sustained during high-risk sports are not the result of 
aggressive, unsportsmanlike conduct (Emery et al., 2010) – the inherent nature of high-risk 
sports engenders injury. In line with this, concussion rates are the highest among hockey players 
(Goodman, Gaetz, & Meichenbaum, 2001), with the majority of injuries resulting from legal 
forms of play (Hagel et al., 2006). It is important to recognize that the term “high-risk sport” is 
not synonymous with “contact sport”. High-risk sports pose a greater risk of sustaining a head 
injury, but do not always include contact play (e.g., downhill skiing, cheerleading, etc.). A recent 
study by Currie, Fields, Patterson and Comstock (2016) further illustrates this idea as it revealed 
that the most common injury sustained in cheerleading – a high-risk, non-contact sport – was 
MHI accounting for 31.1% of all injuries. The susceptibility to injury can also vary according to 
the level of competition (e.g., high school vs. varsity; Guskiewicz, Weaver, Padua, & Garrett, 
2000), sex (Gessel, Collins, & Dick, 2007; Lincoln et al., 2011; Marar et al., 2012), and position 
of play (Delaney, Lacroix, Leclerc, & Johnston, 2002; Pellman, Viano, Tucker, Casson, & 
Waeckerle, 2003). Thus, all of these factors must be taken into consideration when evaluating 
prevalence estimates. 
Despite these considerations, the identification and diagnosis of sports-related MHI 
remains a difficult task. In addition to the aforementioned diagnostic challenges, sports research 
is heavily affected by issues of underreporting. In particular, in sports, financial, corporate, and 
social pressures incentivize athletes to conceal their injuries to accelerate the return to 
competition (Echlin et al., 2010). For example, as many as 30% of college athletes admit that 
they have continued sports participation following a blow to the head that resulted in headache 
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(Kaut, DePompei, Kerr, & Congeni, 2003), and McCrea and colleagues (2004) found that only 
47.3% of high school football players reported in-season MHIs to medical personnel following 
blows to the head, relative to medical and video evidence. Of those who did not report, 66.4% 
stated that they did not feel their injury was serious enough to warrant medical attention, 41% 
expressed that they did not want to be suspended from competition, and 36.1% did not recognize 
their symptoms as a result of MHI (2004). Thus, in addition to reducing the incentive to 
underreport, there is a need to educate players and coaching staff about the severity and potential 
risks associated with MHI to overcome reporting biases.   
The failure to report sports-related MHIs has serious implications. Athletes who disregard 
recovery recommendations and resume participation before symptoms dissipate place themselves 
at a greater risk of further injury and prolonged symptomatology (Cantu, 2009). Indeed, while 
the symptoms of MHI typically resolve over seven to ten days (McCrea et al., 2003), the effects 
can be long-lasting for many individuals (Kay et al., 1993). Referred to as post-concussive 
syndrome (PCS; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), an estimated 30% of individuals 
experience continual symptoms, such as headache, noise and light sensitivity, fatigue, dizziness, 
nausea, irritability, and aggression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), for up to six-
months post-injury (Mittenberg & Strauman, 2000). PCS remains a controversial issue (e.g., 
Bigler et al., 2013) and many have debated the relative contribution of premorbid factors in 
symptom persistence (e.g., Rohling et al., 2011); however, even high-functioning university 
students exhibit subtle neurocognitive impairments after injury (Baker & Good, 2014; vanNoordt 
& Good, 2011) implying that preexisting factors cannot account for such changes. 
Subconcussive Head Impacts 
In recent years, there has been growing concern over the accumulated effects of repetitive 
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asymptomatic blows sustained in sports – commonly termed subconcussions (Belanger, 
Vanderploeg, & McAllister, 2016; Talavage, Nauman, & Leverenz, 2016). Positioned on the 
mildest end of the head injury severity continuum (which ranges from mild to catastrophic: 
subconcussion, MHI, post-concussive syndrome, moderate-to-severe brain injury; Iverson & 
Lange, 2009), a subconcussion is any biomechanical impact to the body or torso that causes an 
acceleration/deceleration force that is below the threshold for, and does not result in any 
symptoms of, concussion (Belanger et al., 2016). Unlike moderate-to-severe injuries which are 
associated with a traumatic incident and/or evident symptomatology, subconcussions are 
relatively unobservable and do not require a hit to the head per se – an impact to the body can 
generate a sufficient force to bring about destructive change (Poole et al., 2015). Further, there 
remains no objective criteria for subconcussion diagnosis (Belanger et al., 2016) and many terms 
have been used to refer these impacts, such as asymptomatic TBI (Gavett et al., 2011a), low-
impact forces (Green & Jordan, 1998), and subclinical concussions (Chamard et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, the long-term consequences of subconcussions are poorly understood and little is 
known about the pathophysiological mechanisms of the cumulative injury process (Guskiewicz 
et al., 2003). However, given that 75% of Canadians between the ages of five and 17 participate 
in organized sports (Canadian Fitness and Lifestyle Research Institute, 2013), the need to further 
investigate these repeated, seemingly trivial, impacts is clear. 
The pathological nature of repetitive, non-concussive blows was first acknowledged in 
1928 when Martland employed the term “punch drunk syndrome” to capture the motor and 
cognitive impairments observed following repeated bouts in boxing (as cited in Baugh et al., 
2012). It was not until almost a century later, however, that researchers began to recognize 
parallels between the relentless blows in boxing and those sustained in other sports (e.g., Omalu 
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et al., 2005). Since that time, two main findings have indicated that multiple subconcussions may 
have detrimental effects on the brain and behaviour.  
First, it has been consistently demonstrated that the incidence of a concussion or 
symptomatic injury is not correlated with the magnitude of the impact that precedes it (Broglio et 
al., 2010; Guskiewicz & Mihalik, 2011; Talavage et al., 2016; Talavage et al., 2014). In 
particular, research that has sought to establish magnitude thresholds for concussion has yielded 
conflicting findings, showing that the magnitude is a necessary, but not sufficient, predictor of 
clinical outcome. In 2003, Pellman and colleagues recreated the football impacts that preceded 
concussions to assess the average peak acceleration required for diagnosis by a medical 
professional. They reported an average threshold of 98g (g-force) for concussion and a minimum 
acceleration of 70g for injury. Conversely, however, in a longitudinal study by the Purdue 
Neurotrauma Group, none of the 27 recorded hits with accelerations greater than 185g led to a 
concussion diagnosis; yet, out of the nine documented concussions in the same study, all were 
preceded by hits below 120g (Breedlove et al., 2012). Collectively, these contradictory findings 
imply that the relationship between impact severity and clinical outcome is more complex than 
previously thought and highlight the potential additive effects of repetitive subconcussions in the 
injury process.  
According to Talavage, Nauman and Leverenz (2016), it is not a single blow that 
produces symptomatic injury, but rather the summation of a number of milder blows; in this 
way, subconcussions have a cumulative effect.  Consistent with this theoretical model, 
neurocognitive impairments have been illustrated following exposure to recurrent 
subconcussions despite no observable or reported symptoms (Talavage et al., 2014). In addition, 
subconcussions have been found to contribute to symptom persistence if sustained during the 
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recovery period after MHI (Abbas et al., 2014), and the amount of subconcussions experienced 
over the course of a season is predictive of pathological changes continuing 2-5 months beyond 
the athletic season (Nauman, Breedlove, Breedlove, Talavage, Robinson, & Leverenz, 2015).  
Second, it has long been known that repetitive head trauma in sports is associated with a 
greater risk of neurodegeneration, such as CTE (as cited in Baugh et al., 2012); however, recent 
efforts have revealed that even athletes without prior concussion are vulnerable (Omalu et al., 
2010). CTE is a neurodegenerative disease associated with severe disturbances in behaviour, 
cognition, and mood (Stern et al., 2011). Unlike post-concussion syndrome (PCS), CTE is not a 
transient state of neural disruption; CTE is a progressive disease that develops insidiously over a 
number of years, until its onset later in life (Gavett, Stern, & McKee, 2011).To date, researchers 
at the Boston University Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy Center have studied the brain tissue 
of up to 62 deceased National Football League (NFL) players, and in 59 of these cases, they have 
established a convincing link between repeated subconcussive exposure and a progressive 
tauopathy known as Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE; Boston University CTE Center, 
n.d.). Although the precise relationship between repeated subconcussion and CTE remains 
speculative, there is research evidence indicating that the continual shearing stress of these blows 
is sufficient to initiate a neurodegenerative cascade (e.g., McKee et al., 2009; McKee et al., 
2010; Omalu et al., 2010).  
Measuring Subconcussion 
Given that subconcussions are not associated with observable signs and symptoms, they 
are difficult to measure objectively. In particular, athletes are unable to self-report the number of 
subconcussions sustained throughout their careers and observational techniques are difficult to 
employ, as the upper and lower limits of subconcussion remain ambiguous (i.e., when an impact 
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becomes clinically-significant and when an impact becomes concussive). Indeed, there are no 
validated assessment tools for capturing subconcussions to date (Montenigro et al., 2016). One 
way researchers have overcome these issues is through the use of Head Impact Telemetry 
System (HITS; Simbex, Lebanon, NH) technology which allows for the recording of real-time 
subconcussive impacts. A helmet-based system of six accelerometers/impact sensors, HITS 
provides information on the location, frequency, and magnitude of acceleration/deceleration 
forces acting on the head and has helped approximate the incidence of these insidious impacts in 
helmeted sports (e.g., Crisco et al., 2010; Greenwald, Gwin, Chu, & Crisco, 2008; Schnebel, 
Anderson, & Gatlin, 2007). For instance, using HITS, Crisco and colleagues (2010) 
demonstrated that varsity football players can sustain greater than 1400 impacts over the course 
of a single season and comparable estimates have been found in ice hockey, with high school 
defensemen sustaining an average of 24.7 impacts per hour of play (Naunheim, Standeven, 
Richter, & Lewis, 2000). Further, in Duma and colleagues’ (2005) longitudinal investigation of 
35 football players, HITS indicated that an overwhelming 89% of all recorded impacts are within 
the subconcussive range (i.e., approximately 60-120g). Although HITS has facilitated 
epidemiological research on subconcussions, it does not capture cumulative exposure over an 
athlete’s lifetime, which is an important consideration in predicting long-term deficits and 
neurodegeneration (Baugh et al., 2012).  
Another way that subconcussions have been measured is through indices of 
subconcussion exposure (e.g., the Head Impact Exposure Estimate [HIEE] and the Cumulative 
Head Impact Index [CHII]) that take various exposure-related factors into account across an 
athlete’s career, such as inter-sport contact differences, player position, and years of play (Kerr et 
al., 2015; Montenigro et al., 2016). These indices often rely on self-reported athletic information 
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and are detailed enough to capture season to season changes (e.g., changes in playing time, 
position, etc.). Indeed, using these estimates, researchers have been able to show the subtle 
additive nature of subconcussions, as they have predicted cognitive deficits, depression, apathy, 
and executive dysfunction years after athletes have retired (Montenigro et al., 2016).  
Biomechanical Correlates of Injury 
Although the human brain is equipped with a number of neuroprotective features, it 
remains vulnerable to external forces. These vulnerabilities are amplified in sports, as athletes 
are regularly subjected to both linear (i.e., direct contact and focal damage) and rotational forces 
(i.e., secondary and diffuse damage) – the primary mechanisms by which head injury occurs 
(King, Yang, Zhang, & Hardy, 2003; Ling, Hardy, & Zetterberg, 2015). In severe brain injury, 
these sudden biomechanical forces can cause substantial structural damage; when a hit is 
sustained, the brain is propelled within the cranium striking the boney protrusions at the base of 
the skull (e.g., coup). In most cases, the brain rebounds similarly in the opposite direction (e.g., 
contre-coup) producing contusions, bruising, hemorrhaging and/or hematomas, and edema 
(Iverson & Lange, 2009). Areas most commonly affected include the frontal and temporal lobes 
(Morales, Diaz-Daza, Hlatky, & Hayman, 2007) and under conditions of high shearing forces, 
the brain stem is especially vulnerable (Zhang, Yang, & King, 2004).  
While both linear and rotational forces contribute to injury (Ji, Zhao, Li & McAllister, 
2014), the majority of biomechanical data have pertained to linear accelerations as HITS does 
not directly capture rotational forces (Breedlove et al., 2012). However, investigations that have 
exclusively focused on linear accelerations have been criticized since many argue that rotational 
acceleration is the principal cause of diffuse brain injury (King et al., 2003). In particular, 
rotational forces – with or without direct contact to the head – produce a shear strain on the 
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cerebral surface, causing neurons, glial cells, and blood vessels to mechanically stretch (Ling et 
al., 2015). Mechanical disruption through stretching, twisting, and shearing forces is sufficient to 
disrupt neural function (Bigler, 2013) and render the brain more susceptible to subsequent 
trauma (Blennow, Hardy, & Zetterberg, 2012). Indeed, Ommaya and colleagues (1968) 
demonstrated that when angular rotation of the head is permitted, injury thresholds decrease and 
the brain’s susceptibility to disruption increases. Thus, it is important to capture both linear and 
rotational biomechanics. 
Biomechanical data has also shown that the location and number of subconcussive 
impacts sustained over the course of a sports season are predictive of alterations in 
neurophysiological functions (Breedlove et al., 2012). Specifically, in a group of asymptomatic 
football players, Talavage and colleagues (2014) revealed that greater deviation in frontal lobe 
fMRI activity between pre- and post-season assessments is associated with a higher proportion of 
impacts to the top-front of the helmet and a greater overall frequency of in-season impacts. 
Similarly, impact frequency and location, not magnitude, best discriminate among clinically- and 
functionally-impaired groups (e.g., concussed vs. non-concussed and functionally-impaired vs. 
non-concussed and unimpaired); and repetitive blows to the front of the helmet are associated 
with the greatest peak rotational accelerations (Breedlove et al., 2012; Crisco et al., 2012; 
Guskiewicz et al., 2007; Robinson et al., 2015). Taken together, these findings strongly implicate 
subconcussive trauma in the pathophysiology of injury and further emphasize that the number of 
blows is a primary predictor of dysfunction. 
Pathophysiological Mechanisms 
Unlike more severe injuries, MHI does not result in structural changes that can be 
detected via traditional neuroimaging techniques (Belanger et al., 2016); rather, these mild 
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impacts cause axonal stretching, triggering a defensive neurometabolic cascade and inducing 
several functional changes (McKee, Daneshvar, Alvarez, & Stein, 2014). Specifically, following 
a mild insult to the brain, neuronal electrochemical gradients are drastically disrupted – 
potassium (K+) is released from cells, while sodium (Na+) and calcium (Ca2+) rush in – resulting 
in increased intracellular Ca2+ levels and depolarization. Simultaneously, excitatory 
neurotransmitter, namely glutamate, is released in excess which further depolarizes axons as this 
chemical substance binds to N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors (Ling et al., 2015). In an 
attempt to restore ionic concentrations to baseline, glucose consumption is increased. This 
increased demand for energy, coupled with reduced cerebral blood flow, causes an energy crisis 
(Giza & Hovda, 2014). To remedy this crisis, Ca2+ is taken up by the mitochondria, obstructing 
oxidative metabolism, and resulting in acute neuronal dysfunction (2014). This period of 
insufficient energy is thought to contribute to vulnerability following MHI (Giza & Hovda, 
2014) which is consistent with the idea that the risk of further injury is greatest within seven to 
ten days of the initial injury (McCrea et al., 2009). In addition to depleting energy stores, 
increased intracellular Ca2+ concentrations also activate calpain (Blennow et al., 2012). Through 
calpain-mediated phosphorylation, the microtubules begin to collapse, disrupting axonal 
transport and function (Giza & Hovda, 2014). Excessive release of glutamate and the influx of 
Ca2+ into the neurons causes extensive neuronal death.  
According to animal models, neuroinflammation also plays a key role in the 
pathophysiology of head injury. For example, in an investigation by Shultz and colleagues 
(2012), a single lateral fluid percussion (analogous to a subconcussive force in humans) was 
associated with an acute neuroinflammatory response in rats, despite no evidence of cognitive, 
emotional or sensorimotor impairment. That is, the rats appeared clinically asymptomatic, yet 
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physiologically, they showed clear evidence of reactive astrogliosis – a marker of 
neurodegeneration (Belanger et al., 2016). Indeed, following axonal injury, disruption to the 
blood-brain barrier, and/or alterations in ionic gradients, microglial cells have been found to 
increase in size, number, and motility, and release cytokines (Blennow et al., 2012; Lucke-Wold 
et al., 2014). Under regular circumstances, acute activation of these first-responders is adaptive; 
however, prolonged glial reactivity can be damaging. In particular, chronic inflammation has 
been associated with the formation of glial tangles or “glial stars” and is thought to contribute to 
problematic tauopathy over time (Ling et al., 2015). Recent research has provided further support 
for this mechanism, as mice exposed to repeated mTBI have demonstrated chronic glial 
activation up to 12-months post-injury (Mouzon et al., 2013). 
Transition from Acute to Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy 
At present, the retrospective nature of CTE diagnosis (Baugh et al., 2012) and the 
selection bias in those referred for neuropathological examination have limited understanding of 
the precise neurodegenerative trajectory of CTE (Belanger et al., 2016). Not all individuals who 
are exposed to these relentless blows are referred for analysis making it difficult to assess the 
true prevalence of this disease in vulnerable populations, such as athletes (Stern et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, all existing cases of CTE have a history of repetitive subconcussion (e.g., athletes, 
military personnel, victims of physical abuse, etc.) indicating that subconcussive impact 
exposure is a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in the development of CTE (Baugh et al., 
2012).  
In all documented cases, CTE is characterized by several neuropathological features and 
the clinical presentation of CTE is reflective of the regions that are most severely affected 
(McKee et al., 2014). These regions typically include the frontal and temporal cortices and the 
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medial structures of the limbic system (amygdala, mammillary bodies, hippocampus; Stern et al., 
2011) which coincides with the profound behavioural (e.g., impulsivity, and aggression), 
emotional (e.g., depression, suicidality, and emotional lability) and cognitive symptoms (e.g., 
attentional deficits, loss of memory, and executive impairments) that define the disease (Jordan, 
2013; McKee et al., 2013, Omalu et al., 2011). In addition, post-mortem analyses reveal widened 
lateral and third ventricles, cavum septum pellucidum (i.e., increased space within the septum), 
thinning of the corpus callosum, and shrunken mammillary bodies which are thought to be the 
result of rapid acceleration/deceleration forces that disrupt neuronal function and contribute to 
loss of neurons with time (McKee et al., 2009). 
On a microscopic level, CTE is characterized by phosphorylated tau deposition forming 
neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs), neurites and glial tangles (Stern et al., 2011). Consistent with the 
proposed mechanisms of injury, it is hypothesized that repeated subconcussive trauma disrupts 
the assembly between tau and tubulin which facilitates the breakdown of the microtubules and 
the development of tau-positive plaques (Lucke-Wold et al., 2014). Indeed, in athletes who 
sustained concussions six months prior to death, tau-positive NFTs are most commonly situated 
around sites of axonal injury (McKee et al., 2014). Similarly, the tau deposition in CTE is unlike 
other tauopathies and is associated with a consistent tau concentration at the sulcal depth and 
perivascular pattern in the superficial layers of the cortex (Goldstein et al., 2012; Smith, et al., 
1997). This unique topography is consistent with kinematic research showing that impact trauma 
generates a distinctive type of stress concentration on the head (Goldstein, 2014). Specifically, in 
contrast to blast trauma which causes diffuse loading and distributes pressure across the head, the 
impacts sustained in sports cause point loading and stress concentration at the base of the sulci. 
Thus, the preferential distribution of tau-immunoreactive tangles around blood vessels and at the 
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depths of the sulci is likely the result of force concentration, further implicating subconcussions 
in CTE pathology. 
Although there is convincing evidence to suggest a link between repetitive 
subconcussions and CTE, this issue remains highly controversial and has initiated significant 
debate – particularly within the NFL. One question that has been raised is whether the 
neuropathology observed in deceased athletes is reflective of the normative aging process or 
Alzheimer’s Disease (AD; e.g., Gardner, Iverson, & McCrory, 2013). While repetitive head 
injury is associated with a greater risk of AD (Lehman, Hein, Baron & Gersic, 2012) and AD 
pathology (i.e., the accumulation of the amyloid precursor protein [APP] and amyloid β peptide 
[Aβ]; see Johnson, Stewart, & Smith, 2010 for a review), Aβ plaques are only evident upon 
autopsy of older athletes and do not appear in early stages of the disease (McKee et al., 2013). 
This is consistent with research demonstrating that CTE occurs much earlier in life than AD and 
can occur in athletes as young as 18 years of age (McKee et al., 2009). Lastly, as discussed 
previously, CTE is associated with a stereotyped distribution of tau and a greater density of 
NFTs and glial tangles compared to AD (McKee et al., 2009).  
Another point of contention is the relative contribution of subconcussions, independent of 
larger magnitude injuries, in the development of CTE. In particular, many have questioned the 
extent to which MHIs account for CTE. Interestingly, research that has examined the influence 
of these insidious impacts, over and above the effects of MHI, has demonstrated a compelling 
link. For instance, the duration of exposure to contact sports strongly predicts CTE pathology 
when controlling for MHI history (Stein, Alvarez, & McKee, 2015) and 16% of all 
neuropathologically diagnosed athletes have no previous history of MHI (Bailes, Petraglia, 
Omalu, Nauman, & Talavage, 2013; Gavett et al., 2011a; Stein, Alvarez, & McKee, 2015). 
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Further, the risk of CTE in boxers is not predicted by the number of times a boxer has been 
knocked out, but rather number of rounds boxed (Orrison et al., 2009).  
Taken together, current research strongly implicates repetitive subconcussive trauma in 
CTE. However, one of the key questions that remains is why all athletes who are exposed to 
repetitive subconcussive trauma do not develop CTE? While the answer to this question remains 
unknown, it has been concluded that subconcussions alone are not sufficient to cause the disease; 
there are a number of other factors that can influence this relationship. For instance, the age at 
which one is first exposed to subconcussions (Field et al. 2003), sex (Baugh et al., 2012), player 
position (Baugh et al., 2015), cognitive reserve (Schneider, 1979) and certain genetic markers 
(Jordan et al., 1997) have all been associated with differences in recovery and symptom 
presentation and are currently being investigated as potential risk-factors for CTE (see Gavett et 
al., 2011a or Stern et al., 2011 for a review).   
Neuropsychological Research  
To date, neuropsychological investigations of subconcussions have yielded inconsistent 
results, further contributing to debate over their significance. While some have failed to 
demonstrate neuropsychological deficits after repeated subconcussion (e.g., Broglio, Eckner, 
Surma, & Kutcher, 2011; Gallant, Drumheller, & McKelvie, 2016; Jennings et al., 2015; 
Putukian, Echemendia, & Mackin, 2000), others have provided compelling evidence for a 
relationship (e.g., Breedlove et al., 2012; Killam et al., 2005; Lipton et al., 2013; McAllister et 
al., 2012; Talavage et al., 2014; Tsushima, Geling, Arnold, & Oshiro, 2016). For example, using 
a variety of clinical measures, such as the Standardized Assessment of Concussion (SAC) and 
the Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT), Miller, Adamson, 
Pink and Sweet (2007) found no pre- to post-season declines in any of the cognitive domains 
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assessed (e.g., verbal memory, visual memory, concentration, processing speed, etc.). In contrast, 
however, Tsushima et al., (2016) used the ImPACT to demonstrate that repeated non-concussive 
injury in contact sports is associated with significantly worse processing speed and reaction time 
compared to low-contact sports.    
Subconcussions by nature are asymptomatic. They are located on the mildest end of the 
spectrum of head injury severity (Iverson & Lange, 2009) and cannot be clinically-diagnosed by 
health professionals. This invisibility not only makes it difficult to measure subconcussions, but 
poses a challenge for researchers examining their neurocognitive sequelae. Assessment tools 
designed to evaluate functioning following severe injury may lack the sensitivity to detect subtler 
changes (Barr & McCrea, 2001) and investigations focusing on a single season of exposure may 
not effectively capture dose-response effects. Indeed, research examining lifetime exposure rates 
has demonstrated greater consistency. A recent study by Montenigro et al. (2016) showed that, 
after a certain threshold, the risk of neurocognitive and neurobehavioural deficits increases 
linearly with each additional impact. Furthermore, career estimates of purposeful heading in 
soccer, not single season rates, are associated with lower scores on measures of attention, 
concentration, and cognitive flexibility (Witol & Webbe, 2003). In addition, findings from 
baseline and post-season designs can be influenced by feigned baseline performance (Erdal, 
2012), practice effects (e.g., Gallant et al., 2016; Vernau et al 2015) and greater performance 
motivation after injury (Rabinowitz, Merritt & Arnett 2015) making it difficult to interpret null 
findings. 
Despite the problems associated with baseline and post-injury neuropsychological testing, 
neuropsychological assessments are reliable indicators of functional changes, and can be of great 
utility when administered as a battery or in combination with neuroimaging techniques (Register-
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Mihalik, Guskiewicz, Mihalik, Schmidt, Kerr, & McCrea, 2012). One of the first empirical 
investigations to effectively demonstrate this was conducted by Talavage and colleagues (2014) 
in a group of football players. On the basis of professionally-diagnosed concussion symptoms 
(clinically-observed impairment [COI- or COI+]) and in-season impairments on the ImPACT 
(functionally-observed impairment [FOI- or FOI+]), players were categorized into three 
impairment groups (COI+/FOI+, COI-/FOI-, or COI-/FOI+). Using this approach, a previously 
unrecognized group of football players was identified: players with significant functional 
impairments, yet no observable concussion symptoms (COI-/FOI+). Interestingly, in addition to 
impairments on ImPACT, the COI-/FOI+ group also exhibited significant alterations in fMRI 
activity between pre- and post-season assessments comparable to those observed in the 
concussed group. In line with a model of accumulated injury, a dose-response relationship was 
found between the number of head impact sustained across the season and the degree of 
deviation from pre-season fMRI assessments. Compared to the other groups, COI-/FOI+ players 
sustained the greatest number of in-season impacts in the 20-80g (subconcussive) range, and a 
greater proportion of impacts to the top-front of the helmet.  
Neuroimaging Research 
With advances in imaging techniques and increasingly precise technology, neuroimaging 
research offers the sensitivity to detect in-season changes and has supported the idea that 
repetitive subconcussions have cumulative effects on the brain. For instance, using Diffusion 
Tensor Imaging (DTI) – an MRI technique that measures the diffusion of water molecules in the 
brain, allowing for mapping of white matter (Basser & Jones, 2002) – researchers have observed 
differences in white matter integrity between soccer players and non-contact athletes (Koerte, 
Ertl-Wagner, Reiser, Zafonte, & Shenton, 2012). In particular, significant increases in radial 
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diffusivity (a measure of axonal and myelin pathology) were observed in the right orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) of soccer players without histories of MHI compared to competitive swimmers 
who did not exhibit significant changes. Given the increased susceptibility to subconcussions in 
soccer (i.e., through the use of purposeful heading) and the OFC’s increased vulnerability in 
closed-head injury (Bigler & Orrison, 2001), these results warrant concern and further implicate 
subconcussions in neuropathology.  
Consistent with DTI research, Shenk and colleagues (2015) showed significant 
alterations in fMRI activity across in-season assessments of football players using an N-back task 
(a visual working memory task that varies memory load and task difficulty by altering the 
position of a target image [e.g., the image 1 trial back, the image 2 trials back]; Miller, Price, 
Okun, Montijo, & Bowers, 2009). Not only did players deviate from baseline at in-season 
assessments, but also, unexpectedly, they exhibited abnormal fMRI activity at post-season 
assessments for greater than two months after regular contact ended. Moreover, the fMRI 
deviations observed reflected impairments in online processing, such that easier task levels (i.e., 
the 0-back condition – examinees are required to remember a predetermined line segment) 
elicited greater activation at post-season compared to pre-season. This indicates that following a 
season of exposure to subconcussions, football players are exerting greater cognitive effort to 
perform similar to how they performed at baseline. Thus, although these players may appear 
asymptomatic in that they do not exhibit clinically-observed impairments or deficits in task 
performance, they are functionally-impaired (Shenk et al., 2015; Talavage et al., 2016).   
Similarly, Abbas and colleagues (2014) observed in-season alterations in functional 
connectivity in the Default Mode Network (DMN) of contact athletes. The changes observed 
were consistent with fluctuations in contact play across the season (e.g., there was a greater 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 22 
decrease in connectivity at month one when contact play first commenced) and notably, there 
was an overall effect of contact status such that contact athletes exhibited significant 
hypoconnectivity relative to controls at both pre-season and post-season assessments. Taken 
together, neuroimaging data provides further evidence of physiological alterations following 
subconcussive exposure and suggests that these changes are cumulative and persistent. 
Although research on subconcussions has increased in recent years, the socioemotional 
sequelae of repeated trauma remains unknown. The observed mood changes and behavioural 
dysregulation (e.g., disinhibition, irritability, agitation, reactive aggression, etc.) in CTE are cited 
as the most upsetting by those afflicted and their families (Baugh et al., 2012), and in the 
moderate-severe TBI literature, participation outcomes and life satisfaction are most impacted by 
social and emotional factors (Draper, Ponsford, & Schonberger, 2007; Larsson et al., 2013). 
Thus, from both a research and clinical perspective, there is a clear need to examine 
socioemotional sequelae in the context of subconcussive injury. 
Socioemotional Outcomes Following Head Injury 
Following head injury, a primary goal of rehabilitation is to facilitate social participation 
and achieve successful community reintegration (Larsson et al., 2013) – most client-directed 
rehabilitation goals reflect the level of participation (e.g., living independently, being employed, 
having a relationship, etc.; Corrigan, Bogner, Mysiw, Clinchot, & Fugate, 2001) and 
participation in society is argued to be the most meaningful indicator of rehabilitation success 
(Cicerone, 2004). In order to achieve successful participation, however, a number of complex 
skills are needed. Unfortunately, many of these skills, including socioemotional and executive 
functions, are compromised following head injury (Hynes, Stone, & Kelso, 2011); individuals 
with a TBI are often described as self-centered, insensitive, disinhibited, inflexible, 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 23 
inappropriate, and lacking in empathy (e.g., Channon, Pelijeff, & Rule, 2005; de Sousa et al., 
2011; Ponsford, Olver, & Curran, 1995). Moreover, in an investigation of the patient-
perspective, items such as “others do not understand my problems”, “failing to notice other 
people’s mood” and “thinking only of myself” were found to significantly predict participation 
following TBI accounting for over 50% of the variation in outcomes (Larsson et al., 2013). 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that individuals with a TBI experience challenges in 
considering the world from others’ perspective or a lack of what is known as theory of mind 
(ToM). 
Despite endorsing similar social norms and beliefs to their non-injured peers, persons with 
a TBI are unable to use this knowledge to execute the appropriate response in social contexts 
(Turkstra, Dixon, & Baker, 2004). As a result, these individuals repeatedly elicit unfavorable 
reactions from peers causing their social networks to deteriorate with time (Stone & Hynes, 2011). 
Several behavioural investigations have provided evidence for this demonstrating that deficient 
ToM reasoning is associated with fewer mutual friendships (Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, & 
Rosnay, 2015), less classroom social skills (Razza & Blair, 2009) and more behavioural problems 
(Hughes & Ensor, 2005). Further, ToM is a key predictor of social competence influencing 
communication, empathy, and conflict resolution (Astington, 2003). Thus, impaired ToM can be 
an important barrier to reintegration following TBI. Greater research is needed to understand the 
mechanisms that underlie this relationship to develop targeted ToM interventions and improve 
overall participation.   
Theory of Mind 
Since its introduction in the 1970’s (e.g., Premack and Woodruff, 1978), theory of mind 
(ToM) has become a widespread topic of investigation capturing the interest of researchers from 
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a variety of scientific fields (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2014). In psychology, ToM – 
used synonymously with “perspective-taking”, “social inference”, and “mentalizing” – is 
generally defined as the capacity to infer the mental states of others (e.g., others’ thoughts, 
feelings, motives, etc.; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Under this broad definition, ToM 
includes the understanding that others’ mental states may not represent observed facts and can 
consequently differ from one’s own (Hynes et al., 2011). The acquisition of these principles 
follows a relatively consistent developmental trajectory (Wellman, 1990). By the age of four, 
children understand that beliefs and desires drive behaviour, even when those beliefs are 
mistaken (this is referred to as first order belief-state reasoning). From this initial ToM capacity, 
mental state reasoning becomes increasingly complex; second-order ToM (SOTOM) reasoning 
(e.g., the identification of embedded perspectives, “Sally thinks that Ann thinks that…”; Martin-
Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010) is observed by the age of six or seven (Perner & Wimmer, 
1985), and continues to develop into adulthood (see Bellerose, Bernier, Beaudoin, Gravel, & 
Beauchamp, 2015 for more details).  
While the developmental trajectory of ToM is well-accepted across fields, how ToM is 
acquired throughout the lifespan remains a topic of debate. Specifically, significant disparities 
exist in the mechanisms proposed to underpin ToM processing. Mahy and colleagues (2014) 
report that there are four principal explanations in the current literature: (a) modularity, which 
postulates that a natural ToM module exists in the brain and innately drives mental state 
reasoning; (b) simulation theories, which state that ToM arises by projecting oneself into others’ 
shoes and simulating their experiences in the self; (c) executive accounts, which posit that 
executive functioning (particularly inhibition) is necessary and sufficient for ToM reasoning; 
and, lastly, (d) theory theory, which proposes that experience plays a vital role in ToM, as we 
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continuously update stored knowledge about the relationship between mental states and actions 
in a manner similar to the process of testing a scientific theory (Mahy et al., 2014). While these 
accounts are often placed in opposition, the present study adopts an alternative stance and 
integrates these accounts to explain ToM reasoning. Thus, throughout this paper, a combination 
of ToM theories will be discussed, assimilating physiological and behavioural evidence to 
explain mentalizing following head injury.  
Assessing Theory of Mind   
As a result of such theoretical disagreements, the assessment of ToM has varied 
considerably across fields (see Hynes et al., 2011). Largely, ToM has been assessed in 
adolescence and adulthood by adapting the content of child paradigms (Martin-Rodríguez & 
León-Carrión, 2010). In particular, this is regularly accomplished using belief-reasoning tasks 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), such as the “Sally-Ann Task” or the false-belief task (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). In its basic form, the belief-reasoning task presents participants with a scenario in 
which a character holds a belief that is at odds with the actual state of events (e.g., Sally falsely 
believes that her chocolates are in a basket when in fact they are in a box). To succeed at this 
task, participants must correctly discriminate between the character’s false-belief and their own 
beliefs by using ToM to infer the character’s mental state. While these tasks have successfully 
identified ToM impairments in children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), their simplicity renders them 
unsuitable for discriminating among adult populations. To avoid ceiling effects, therefore, adult 
adaptations have involved more complex SOTOM paradigms. However, when task complexity is 
increased in this way, greater demands are inadvertently placed on executive skills, obscuring 
interpretations of task performance (i.e., impaired performance may be a function of ToM 
abilities or cognitive capacity). Thus, these adaptations have been extensively criticized for 
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lacking sensitivity and specificity, and have led to the development of adult-specific paradigms 
(e.g., Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013).  
More recently, findings from social neuroscience have prompted an alternative approach 
to ToM assessment which divides this capacity into two independent subcomponents: cognitive 
ToM and affective ToM. Using component-specific tasks that independently assess affective 
versus cognitive ToM, neuroimaging research has shown that these subcomponents engage 
dissociable neural systems (Kalbe et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2005). Cognitive ToM, defined as the ability to infer the thoughts of others, is 
primarily associated with false-belief tasks and indirect speech, while affective ToM, defined as 
the ability to infer what others are feeling, is typically associated with tasks requiring emotive 
communication and affect recognition (Dennis et al., 2013; Hynes, Baird & Grafton, 2006).  
The key factor that differentiates the two types of perspective-taking is the affective 
content of mental stimuli; thus, researchers have sought to devise paradigms that independently 
assess the ability to infer others’ emotions. For example, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test 
(RMET) has been widely-used to capture affective ToM (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997). In the Eyes test, participants are presented with static images of eyes and 
asked to select one of four words (e.g., fearful, panicked, etc.) that best depicts the emotion 
experienced by the photographed individual. The Eyes test aims to minimize executive demands 
by providing participants with a glossary of definitions and incites spontaneous affective 
reasoning through its emotionally-charged stimuli (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2006; Stone, Baron-
Cohen, Young, & Calder, 1998). Indeed, Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) showed that adults with 
Asperger’s Syndrome – a condition characterized by profound emotional challenges without 
cognitive delay – are significantly impaired at the RMET despite successfully detecting 
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unemotional stimuli. Similarly, the Faux-Pas Recognition Task has been widely used to capture 
impairments in affective ToM (Stone et al., 1998). The task requires participants to identify 
social faux-pas or awkward remarks using perspective-taking to determine why the remarks were 
inappropriate. Previous research has shown consistent deficits on faux-pas tasks following head 
injury (see Martin-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010 for a review); however, like belief-
reasoning tasks, faux-pas tasks fail to capture subtle differences in normative ToM reasoning as 
ceiling effects are common in healthy control groups (e.g., Lee et al., 2010; Martino, Bucay, 
Butman, & Allegri, 2007).   
In addition to belief-reasoning tasks, a number of other paradigms have been created to 
assess cognitive ToM. Predominantly, these paradigms have focused on the comprehension of 
indirect speech (IS; e.g., sarcasm, irony, metaphors, jokes, etc.). To succeed at such tasks, 
participants must recognize a discrepancy between the literal meaning of remarks and the 
indirect intent of the speaker (Martin-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010). This requires cognitive 
ToM, as participants must first infer the speaker’s thoughts or beliefs (Channon, Pelijeff, & Rule, 
2005). Indeed, research has shown that children must successfully complete SOTOM tasks 
before they can differentiate between ironic jokes and lies (Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995), 
and executive skills or social knowledge (i.e., understanding of the social usage of sarcasm; 
Channon et al., 2005) have not been found to predict IS performance.  
Although a variety of ToM assessments have been established, several important 
limitations of existing tools should be noted when attempting to assess ToM in cognitively-
competent populations, such as university students (see Dodell-Feder et al., 2013 for a more 
detailed review). First, forced-choice ToM tests (e.g., RMET) are still widely used, creating an 
artificial environment for ToM reasoning. In particular, when multiple response options are 
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presented simultaneously and over an extended period of time, accuracy does not rely on mental 
state inference alone. Alternative responses can be contrasted, engaging problem solving 
techniques rather than one’s capacity for mentalizing. For instance, when working memory 
demands are eliminated by providing participants with unlimited exposure to ToM stories, 
individuals with head injuries perform similar to healthy controls (Bibby & McDonald, 2005). 
Similarly, when forced-choice paradigms are used ceiling effects are regularly observed among 
high-functioning control groups (e.g., Channon, Pellijeff, & Rule, 2005; Kalbe et al., 2007; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  
Second, tasks designed for research settings often remove ToM reasoning from a 
dynamic social context with rules and contingencies, limiting ecological validity and the 
applicability of findings to real-world social encounters (Dodell-Feder et al., 2013). In the 
absence of such cues, results may overestimate the magnitude of difficulties. In cases where 
social settings are not feasible, efforts should be made to provide sufficient details regarding the 
social context. Third, the majority of ToM tasks explicitly prompt participants to engage in 
mental state reasoning, limiting the generalizability of findings to everyday circumstances. The 
complexity of human sociality demands the spontaneous attribution of perspectives without 
explicit instruction, thus, tests that cue mentalizing may overestimate ToM performance. 
Finally, to capture first-person accounts of perspective-taking abilities, a number of self-
report ToM questionnaires have been established; however, these assessments require insight 
(Muller et al., 2010) – a capacity that is often compromised in clinical populations (Bivona et al., 
2014). According to simulation theory, insight or self-awareness is a prerequisite for perspective-
taking; to correctly interpret others’ emotional states, one must first be capable of simulating 
such states in the self (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Consistent with this idea, Bivona and 
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colleagues (2014) showed that low self-awareness after TBI is associated with significant 
impairments on the Faux-Pas Recognition test. Thus, self-report ToM measures, such as the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), may not be sensitive enough to detect subtle 
deficits when assessing populations that lack self-awareness and a battery of ToM assessments 
may be more suitable to corroborate self-report results. 
 In sum, additional tools for assessing ToM reasoning are needed to capture subtle, 
everyday variations in this multidimensional construct. In the current study, a novel perspective-
taking task (PTT) was created with particular consideration to the limitations mentioned above. 
This task was implemented to assess spontaneous mental state reasoning, independent of 
problem-solving abilities, in university students. In addition, as a means of evaluating the 
validity of the PTT as an index of ToM, the IRI and the RMET were also administered. Both of 
these measures have proven sensitive to individual differences in ToM processing, however, 
their inclusion in this study will help assess their utility in highly competent populations.   
Neurological Basis of Theory of Mind 
Despite substantial variability in its assessment, neuroimaging studies of ToM have 
converged on a reliable group of brain regions – the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior 
cingulate cortex (pCC) and precuneus (medial superior parietal cortex), the bilateral temporo-
parietal junction (bTPJ), and the superior temporal sulcus (STS; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; 
Gallagher et al., 2000; Frith & Frith, 2000; Hynes et al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001). In both experimental and clinical 
investigations, the relative importance of these regions has been well-documented by contrasting 
their selective activation during ToM tasks with activation during control tasks (e.g., those 
requiring physical/non-mental inferences). For instance, in an early positron emission 
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tomography (PET) experiment (Fletcher et al., 1995), significant increases in activity were 
observed in the medial PFC, PCC and TPJ while participants mentally responded to questions 
about mental state stories compared to physical stories leading researchers to believe that these 
regions form a specific ToM network. Indeed, research has shown that the consideration of 
physical objects, external representations, or physical characteristics does not lead to differential 
brain activity in these regions (see Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013 for a review).  
Despite findings of a robust ToM network, some have argued that the medial PFC is 
primarily responsible for ToM reasoning. This is consistent with a review of the neuroimaging 
literature which found that the PFC has been implicated in ToM in 93% of studies, relative to the 
PCC and TPJ which were implicated in 55% and 58% of studies, respectively (Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009). Similarly, although Gallagher and colleagues (2000) noted significant 
involvement of all three regions (mPFC, PCC and TPJ) during mental state attribution versus 
physical attribution and sentence-decoding, the mPFC was the only region that showed activity 
exclusively during mental state reasoning. That is, the PCC and TPJ also showed significant 
activation during the non-ToM task versus sentence-decoding comparison, implying that these 
regions may also be involved in other cognitive processes. This is consistent with research 
demonstrating that the medial PCC and the precuneus are involved in mental imagery and the 
integration of memory and somatosensory processes (Hagmann et al., 2008; Mar, 2011), and the 
TPJ is closely linked to the reorienting of attention to unexpected stimuli (Ferstl, Neumann, 
Bogler, & von Cramon, 2008).  
Nonetheless, the necessary role of the mPFC in mentalizing remains controversial; the 
mPFC has also been found to play a role in social and non-social cognitive processes such as 
self-perception, emotional processing, attention and stimulus-oriented perception (Amodio & 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 31 
Frith 2006; Gilbert, Williamson, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2007; Saxe & Powell, 
2006) and there has been some evidence of preserved ToM in light of extensive mPFC damage 
(Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004). Thus, the question remains: is the mPFC’s 
involvement specific to understanding mental states or does the mPFC respond more generally to 
tasks that demand other-oriented processing? To address this, Mitchell, Banaji and Macrae 
(2005) used fMRI to examine participants while they judged how a number of words – 
psychological states versus physical attributes – applied to two actors, humans and dogs. 
Irrespective of whether the actor was a human or a dog, the researchers found that mPFC activity 
increased when participants made judgments about psychological states, providing evidence that 
the mPFC’s role is specific to mental-state judgments. While this issue remains a topic of debate, 
taken together, findings imply that the PFC is especially critical in ToM processing (Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003; Stuss, et al., 2001).  
Neuroimaging research has also subdivided ToM into two component networks for 
cognitive versus affective ToM (Hynes et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, & 
Levkovitz 2010; Stuss et al., 2001; Eslinger, 1998). In particular, the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) has been found to play a pertinent role in affective ToM (Leopold et al., 2012; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, & Aharon-Peretz, 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005) given its 
reciprocal connectivity with subcortical structures (e.g., brainstem, hypothalamus, and amygdala; 
Barbas, Saha, Rempel-Clower, & Ghashghaei, 2003), while the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) has been implicated in cognitive ToM, given its role in executive function (Kalbe et 
al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2011). Indeed, focal brain damage/disruption and domain-specific 
ToM tasks have provided empirical support for this distinction. For instance, Shamay-Tsoory 
and colleagues (2005) observed significant impairments in affective ToM, but not false-belief 
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reasoning, following extensive damage to the vmPFC. Likewise, Kalbe et al. (2010) revealed 
deficits in cognitive, but not affective, items of the “Yoni” task (for task details see Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2006) when repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) was used to 
disrupt DLPFC activity.  
This distinction has been further supported by studies showing that cognitive and 
affective ToM are disproportionately affected following brain trauma (e.g, Bellerose et al., 2015; 
Dennis et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2015). Research has shown that affective ToM is more 
vulnerable to impairment following injury exhibiting a lower threshold for disruption compared 
to cognitive ToM. For example, in a sample of 82 children with TBI, Dennis and colleagues 
(2013) showed that while both ToM components are disrupted after moderate-to-severe injuries, 
only affective ToM is compromised after mild trauma. In line with this, Ryan and colleagues 
(2015) did not observe any significant differences between those with mild-moderate TBI and 
typically-developing controls using the Jack and Jill task (see Dennis et al., 2012 for task details) 
– a cartoon-based measure of cognitive ToM; impairments were only observed in the severe TBI 
group. These results provide further evidence of a neurological dissociation between cognitive 
and affective ToM, implying that cognitive ToM may escape the negative consequences of brain 
injury, given its association with dorsolateral regions of the PFC, while affective ToM – 
subserved by more vulnerable ventromedial regions (Morales et al., 2007) – is afflicted.  
Embodied Cognition and Simulation 
Despite over 400 neuroimaging reports of the neural basis of ToM (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 
2013), the issue of how the human brain allows for mental state reasoning continues to be 
debated. At present, two accounts of ToM have prevailed: simulation theory and theory-theory. 
Although many factors differentiate the two accounts, the degree of personal involvement or 
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embodiment appears to be a core difference (Gallese & Goldman, 1998); simulation 
characterizes ToM as the internal replication of a target’s mental state (Gordon, 1986), while 
theory-theory describes ToM as a personally-removed event involving theoretical reasoning and 
causal laws. The following section will review both of these accounts in turn and propose an 
alternative theoretical framework whereby the two mechanisms are presented, not in opposition, 
but as distinct explanations for the two subcomponents of ToM (see Kalbe, Grabenhorst, Brand, 
Kessler, Hilker, & Markowitsch, 2007 for more details). 
According to the simulation account of ToM, mentalizing is not merely the recognition of 
another’s mental state, but the embodiment or internal production of the processes that represent 
another’s state (Gallese & Goldman, 1998); that is, to have ToM is to physically experience 
another’s experience. This idea of embodied cognition – the notion that bodily actions and 
representations play a primary role in cognition (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) – has gained 
interest in recent years following the discovery of the mirror neuron (MN) system. Originally 
identified in macaques (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996), the MN system is a set of 
neurons which are responsive to both the engagement in, and viewing of, an action. For example, 
observing a motor movement, such as grasping a stick, activates the same motor system in the 
observer, as if he/she were grasping the stick him/herself. Notably, the MN system has been 
shown to be particularly responsive to goal-directed acts – observing the same grasping 
movement in the absence of a target object or through the use of tools does not elicit a MN 
response (Gallese et al., 1996). Thus, understanding the intent of another’s action, and activation 
of the MN system, apparently requires more than just a visual representation of others’ 
behaviour. To understand and potentially re-create others’ intentional acts, Gallese and Goldman 
(1998) propose that the observer must embody or simulate the intended goal in his/her own MN 
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network. The question remains, however, does this embodied process explain all types of mental 
state inferences? Employing a similar theoretical framework to Kalbe et al. (2007), the current 
study proposes that a simulation mechanism is particularly relevant for understanding emotional 
states.  
As previously noted, there is considerable evidence implicating the vmPFC in affective 
ToM (Leopold et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). The 
vmPFC, with its bidirectional connections to lower limbic structures (Kolb & Whishaw, 2009), 
has also been associated with emotional processing in general and the regulation of visceral 
arousal cues (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) rendering it a likely candidate for embodied 
cognition (Body, 2007). The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH), postulated by Damasio and 
colleagues (1998) proposes this idea. Physiological activation, modulated by the vmPFC, 
informs cognition and impacts subsequent behaviour. According to Damasio et al., (1998), the 
vmPFC regulates visceral/emotional cues (e.g., increased respiration, sweaty palms, etc.) – 
arising from bioregulatory processes – to reduce the complexity of decision-making and facilitate 
advantageous decisions. Specifically, in ambiguous situations, or when cognitive reasoning alone 
is insufficient, the vmPFC informs decision-making by marking suitable response options with 
visceral signals or emotional “markers” (Bechara et al., 2000). Indeed, following damage to the 
vmPFC individuals exhibit a reduction in visceral cues – indexed by attenuated electrodermal 
activation (EDA; Damasio et al., 1998; Kalbe et al., 2007; Tranel, 2000). In the absence of these 
biasing markers, the distinction between advantageous and disadvantageous responses is less 
clear and decision making is compromised (see Reinmann & Bechara, 2010 for a review). In 
fact, even subtle damage to the vmPFC has been linked to decreased emotional arousal and 
impaired decision making (Baker & Good, 2014; vanNoordt & Good, 2011).  
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Although the SMH was initially devised to explain deficiencies in decision making after 
vmPFC damage, it has now been applied more broadly to a number of social domains, including 
affective perspective-taking (Body, 2007). In fact, research with vmPFC patients has 
demonstrated significant correlations between impairments in decision-making and affective 
ToM (Shamay-Tsoory, Suleiman, Aharon-Peretz, Gohary, & Hirschberger, 2012), and in healthy 
subjects, affective ToM stories are associated with greater EDA levels relative to control and 
cognitive ToM stories (Kalbe Grabenhorst, Brand, Kessler, Hilker, & Markowitsch, 2007). 
Adopting the simulation account therefore, affective ToM relies on visceral cues by the implicit 
simulation of others’ emotions in the self (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). This physiological 
activation, regulated by the vmPFC, is then used to inform cognition and make accurate 
inferences about others’ feelings (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).  
It is important to emphasize, however, that these arousal signals influence behaviour 
without conscious awareness and are predominately associated with emotionally-guided, 
automatic decisions (Body, 2007). The vmPFC’s role in judging others’ intentions is specific to 
situations when emotional processing is required to infer intent (Young, Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, Hauser, & Damasio, 2010). Cognitive ToM is not similarly influenced by 
physiological cues (Kalbe et al., 2007). In fact, following vmPFC disruption, attenuated 
physiological arousal and impaired social cognition occurs in the absence of cognitive deficits, as 
abstract and academic knowledge are retained (e.g., Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000; 
vanNoordt & Good, 2011). Alternatively, cognitive ToM is thought to rely on a distinct theory-
testing mechanism involving causal laws about the relationship between agents and social 
events. Known as theory-theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992), it has been proposed that cognitive 
ToM occurs within a theoretical framework. As evidence about mental concepts and their 
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associated behavioural responses is collected, observers revise this framework, much like a 
scientist revises a theory as new evidence is collected. This explanation is consistent with 
findings from Mitchell and colleagues (2006) which demonstrate that thinking about similar 
others engages the vmPFC, while thinking about dissimilar others recruits greater dorsal PFC 
involvement. This dissociation between PFC regions further suggests that cognitive ToM occurs 
independently from one’s own mental state.  
Theory of Mind After Head Injury  
Overall, perspective-taking deficits have been found after head injury; however, results 
have varied depending on the subtype of ToM assessed, the tasks/paradigms implemented, and 
the area of the brain afflicted by injury (Hynes et al., 2011; Martin-Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 
2010). For instance, lower-level cognitive reasoning, such as the ability to identify false-beliefs 
and first-order ToM (FOTOM) are often unaffected by brain injury, while faux-pas and 
emotional state reasoning are frequently compromised (i.e., affective ToM; e.g., Snodgrass & 
Knott, 2006). Similarly, although Martin-Rodríguez and León-Carrión (2010) found a moderate 
to large effect of TBI on global ToM reasoning, they identified an interesting pattern among 
different ToM paradigms. Faux-pas and indirect speech tasks revealed the largest effect sizes 
(i.e., d = 0.70 and 0.87 respectively; 2010), while FOTOM were not as affected (d = 0.52).  
Consistent with the aforementioned mechanisms of affective versus cognitive ToM, 
measures that assess these components independently have yielded variable results: assessments 
invoking greater affective ToM (e.g., faux-pas tasks, the Eyes test, etc.) demonstrate greater 
sensitivity to impairment following injury (Hynes et al., 2011). Indeed, following mPFC damage, 
Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, and Aharon-Perertz (2006) reported significant impairments in 
affective, but not cognitive, ToM. A similar effect has been found following mild injury; in a 
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group of preschool children with MHIs, Bellerose and colleagues (2015) found greater 
impairments in recognizing the effect of desires on characters’ feelings than on characters’ 
beliefs. Moreover, although adolescents with moderate-to-severe TBI endorse similar social 
norms to their typically-developing peers, they continue to demonstrate significant challenges in 
SOTOM tasks, gauging whether a communicator is speaking at an appropriate level for his/her 
audience, and identifying when a speaker is dominating a conversation (Turkstra et al., 2004). 
Taken together, these results demonstrate an increased vulnerability of affective ToM following 
injury and imply that these deficits are not attributable to a lack of knowledge of social 
pragmatics. 
The Present Study 
In the majority of closed-head injuries (CHI), the frontal regions of the brain, namely the 
ventromedial, are the most susceptible to disruption, given their location relative to the boney 
protrusions of the skull (Morales et al., 2007; Wallis, 2007). Specifically, when an impact is 
sustained, the vmPFC is highly vulnerable to coup-contre-coup forces and subsequent contact 
with the sphenoid bone and cribiform plate (Bigler & Orrison, 2001). Collision data has 
confirmed this frontal vulnerability in sports, demonstrating that the front of the helmet records 
the most subconcussive impacts in games and practices (Crisco et al., 2010), and that the 
distribution of impacts to the facemask of the helmet is one of the most significant predictors of 
in-season fMRI alterations (Robinson et al., 2015). Thus, the prefrontal regions that are the most 
afflicted by subconcussion and most vulnerable to disruption, are those which play a critical role 
in affective ToM reasoning.  
Preliminary data has revealed that physiological arousal varies as a function of SIE, such 
that greater SIE is associated with lower levels of EDA (Gallant, Alcock, & Good, 2016). This 
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implies that even subtle injuries to the vmPFC may be sufficient to deprive individuals of 
physiological/emotive feedback, potentially rendering these individuals less capable of mental 
state simulation. Indeed, preliminary data has shown that repeated subconcussive exposure is 
predictive of decreased interpersonal sensitivity and attentiveness to emotions, indicating that the 
accumulation of this subtle trauma may be sufficient to disrupt one’s responsivity to his/her 
environment and internal states (Gallant & Good, 2016).  
The purpose of this study, therefore, was to elucidate the nature of ToM in high-
functioning university students with a history of recurrent subconcussion. Specifically, the 
current study sought to evaluate whether performance on affective perspective-taking scenarios 
following high SIE is mediated by physiological underarousal. By using self-reported athletic 
involvement as an index of exposure to subconcussive events – from elementary school to 
university – a continuum of SIE was established and allowed for the investigation of dose-
response relationships. In addition, to address the aforementioned flaws associated with 
traditional ToM assessments, and to examine the validity of traditional ToM assessments in 
competent populations, the current study implemented a computerized perspective-taking task, 
along with two widely-used ToM assessments (RMET and the IRI; allowing for comparison 
across measures). This computerized task was formulated based on previous materials by Hynes 
and colleagues (2006) with the intent to establish a ToM measure sensitive enough to detect 
subtle variations in ToM reasoning in university students. Importantly, to evaluate the 
mechanisms of affective and cognitive ToM, each scenario was designed to specifically address 
one type of reasoning (i.e., half focused on the characters’ emotional experiences and half 
depicted the characters’ thoughts and beliefs) and indices of physiological arousal were obtained 
throughout the duration of the task.   
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In addition, this study aimed to bridge the gap in the subconcussion literature by 
addressing socioemotional outcomes. The detrimental nature of repetitive subconcussive impacts 
remains controversial; thus, the present study sought to expand current knowledge of their 
cumulative effects and determine whether the outcomes observed following prolonged 
subconcussive exposure mirror those observed following MHI, albeit on a subtler level. This led 
to the following predictions. 
I. It was expected that high-risk athletes, as well as those with a history of MHI, 
would present with higher SIE, given the nature of high-risk sports and the head 
injury severity continuum (i.e., as you sustain a greater number of subconcussions 
you encroach upon MHI). In turn, this would validate the use of athletic history as 
an index subconcussion vulnerability. 
II. Based on previous research demonstrating social and emotional incompetence 
after injury (Hynes et al., 2011), and the spectrum of head injury severity (Iverson 
& Lange, 2009), it was expected that individuals with a greater history of SIE 
would exhibit poorer overall ToM reasoning on the PTT, compared to those with 
minimal SIE and non-athlete controls.  
III. The greatest decrements were expected in the affective ToM domain, compared to 
cognitive ToM, according to previous research demonstrating that affective ToM 
is subserved by the vmPFC (e.g., Hynes et al., 2006) and is more susceptible to 
disruption following mild injury (e.g., Bellerose et al., 2015).  
IV. Based on the continuum of head injury severity (Iverson & Lange, 2009), and 
similar to previous findings in the MHI (e.g., Barry & Good, 2015; Baker & 
Good, 2014; vanNoordt & Good, 2011) and athletic populations (Gallant et al., 
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2016), it was hypothesized that baseline physiological arousal would vary as a 
function of SIE. That is, those with a history of greater SIE were expected to 
display lower physiological arousal (as evidenced by decreased EDA) than their 
low-exposure counterparts and controls.  
V. Lastly, based on the assumption that affective ToM and cognitive ToM engage 
disparate underlying systems of the PFC, individuals with greater SIE were 
expected to show reduced physiological arousal with respect to affective, not 
cognitive, perspective-taking scenarios. In other words, physiological 
underarousal was expected to mediate the relationship between SIE and affective 
ToM reasoning. 
Method 
Participants 
77 (22 male and 55 female) participants (Mage = 19.88, SD = 2.42) were recruited using 
Brock University’s Psychology Department research website (SONA) and various poster 
advertisements across the university campus.1 All recruitment statements and advertisements 
informed participants that the general purpose of the study was to examine individual differences 
between athletes and non-athletes (See Appendix A). To avoid diagnosis threat – an effect 
whereby simply calling attention to a head injury subsequently impairs performance on cognitive 
tests (Suhr, & Gunstad, 2002; 2005) – participants were not explicitly recruited on the basis of 
head injury status or subconcussive impact exposure.  
                                                
1 Originally 83 university students participated in the study but six participants were not included in any of the 
statistical analyses. For two participants, the data (i.e., physiological data during the Perspective-Taking Task) was 
lost in a computer malfunction; one participant was excluded due to noncompliance with the study instructions; one 
was excluded due to the severity of his/her injury (i.e., moderate-severe range); and two participants were excluded 
due to non-completion of the study. 
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Out of the sample, 32 (41.6%) participants acknowledged a history of MHI, while 45 did 
not (58.4%). Of those who reported a previous MHI, 19 (59.4%) were female and 13 (40.6%) 
were male. Age, education, ethnicity, and maternal and paternal education did not considerably 
differ as a function of MHI status. The majority of injuries (46.9%) were found to be the result of 
sports-related activities, while falls (28.1%), motor vehicle collisions (12.5%), and other causes 
(15.6%) – such as running into a pole or playground structure, fighting, and bullying – accounted 
for the remainder of injuries (See Table 1). Interestingly, hockey and figure skating were the 
most commonly reported sports to result in injury, each accounting for 9.4% of all injuries. In 
terms of injury location, most injuries were sustained to the back (34.4%) and front (28.1%) of 
the head, which is consistent with previous research demonstrating that the risk of injury in 
sports is greatest when impacts are sustained to the front or back of the helmet (Broglio et al., 
2010). All injury locations and associated frequencies are presented in Table 2. Moreover, the 
majority of individuals (46.9%) reported sustaining their MHI between the ages of 16 and 20 
years, which is consistent with previous findings from the NCR Lab (e.g., Barry & Good, 2015).  
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Table 1 
Etiologies of Self-Reported Most Recent Mild Head Injury (n=32) 
Etiology n % of total  
Sports-related activity 14 46.9  
 High-risk sport 9 28.1  
  Hockey 3 9.4  
  Soccer 1 3.1  
  Rugby 1 3.1  
  Cheerleading 1 3.1  
  Figure skating 3 9.4  
 Low-risk sport 5 15.6  
  Basketball 1 3.1  
  Baseball 1 3.1  
  Badminton 1 3.1  
  Volleyball 1 3.1  
  Ultimate Frisbee 1 3.1  
Falling 9 28.1  
Motor vehicle collision 4 12.5  
Other 5 15.6  
Note: The category of ‘Other’ included hitting head on playground, running into a pole, fighting, 
and bullying. 
 
 
Table 3 provides further descriptive statistics regarding the severity of self-reported 
injuries. As observed, 16 (50.0%) of these subjects reported that they had experienced symptoms 
for greater than 20 minutes following their injuries and 16 (50%) reported losing consciousness. 
Notably, only 50% of participants who reported a MHI sought medical attention, yet 84.4% 
endorsed that the injury resulted in a diagnosed concussion. 
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Table 2 
Locations of Self-Reported Most Recent Mild Head Injury (n =32) 
Injury Location n % of total  
Front of the head 9 28.1  
Left side of the head 5 15.6  
Right side of the head 0 0  
Back of the head 11 34.4  
I can’t remember 5 15.6  
Other 2 6.3  
Note: The category of ‘Other’ included injuries to the top of the head. 
 
Table 3  
Injury Severity Indicators of Self-Reported Mild Head Injury (n = 32)  
Injury Severity Indicators n % of total 
 
 
 
Symptoms > 20 minutes 16 50.0  
Loss of consciousness (LOC) 16 50.0  
Duration of LOC    
 < 5 minutes 12 37.5  
 < 30 minutes 2 6.3  
 < 24 hours 2 6.3  
Diagnosed concussion 27 84.4  
Required stitches 3 9.4  
Received medical treatment 16 50.0  
Overnight at medical facility 2 6.3  
More than one injury 11 34.4  
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Non-athletes, as well as athletes involved in both high- and low-risk sports were recruited 
to obtain a range of SIE. Participants were then categorized on the basis of self-reported athletic 
status such that 44 individuals identified as non-athletes (57.1%), 18 as low-risk athletes 
(23.4%), and 15 as high-risk athletes (19.5%). Low- and high-risk classifications were 
determined according to the top ranked sport listed for university participation. A list of all 
reported sports and associated frequencies can be found in Table 4 and frequencies of 
participants by MHI and athletic status can be found in Table 5. 
 
Table 4 
Self-reported Sport-related Activities Currently Played in University (n=33) 
 High-Risk Athletes 
(n=15)   
Low-Risk Athletes 
(n=18) 
 
Sport-related activity   
 
n % of total 
 
Sport-related activity n % of total 
Ice Hockey 4 12.1  Basketball 1 3.0 
Soccer 6 18.2  Volleyball 2 6.1 
Figure Skating 3 9.1  Dance 2 6.1 
Cheerleading 1 3.0  Ultimate Frisbee 3 9.1 
Power/Olympic Lifting 1 3.0  Fencing 2 6.1 
    Baseball 1 3.0 
    Softball 2 6.1 
    Other low-risk Sports 5 15.2 
Note: Other low-risk sports consisted of golf, badminton, rowing/kayaking, running/cross 
country, and field hockey. 
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Table 5 
Frequencies of Participants by Mild Head Injury and Athletic Status  
Athletic Status 
MHI No MHI Total 
n % n % n % 
Non-athlete 13 16.9 31 40.3 44 57.1 
Low-risk athlete 10 13.0 8 10.4 18 23.4 
High-risk athlete 9 11.7 6 7.8 15 19.5 
Total 32 41.6 45 58.4   
 
Materials 
Materials consisted of self-report measures, standardized neuropsychological tests, 
computerized performance-based tasks, and non-invasive physiological measures. Refer to 
Appendix A to view attached materials (except for the clinically protected measures).  
Physiological measures. Polygraph Professional Suite Software and Polygraph 
Professional equipment (Limestone Technologies, 2008) was used to measure all physiological 
indices – namely, heart rate, EDA, blood pressure, and respiration. The Datapac USB 16-bit Data 
Acquisition Instrument was used along with a 16-inch Acer Laptop Computer. Silver-silver 
chloride pads were used to collect EDA and were placed on the index and fourth fingers of the 
participant’s non-dominant hand. A pulse oximeter was placed on the middle finger of the 
participant’s non-dominant hand to measure heart rate. Respiration was recorded via two 
pneumatic chest bands – the upper was placed around the chest and the lower was placed around 
the abdomen, over participants’ clothing. Blood pressure was measured via a blood pressure cuff 
(Omaron Healthcare Inc.) that was placed on the brachial artery/upper portion of each 
participant’s left arm. 
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Neuropsychological assessments.  
The Wide Range Achievement Test-4. (WRAT-4; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006) was 
administered to obtain a proxy of intellectual capacity. The WRAT-4 is a standardized 
assessment of fundamental academic skills and has four subtests including Sentence 
Comprehension, Word Reading, Spelling, and Math Computation. The WRAT-4 also consists of 
two separate and interchangeable forms (Blue and Green) that yield comparable results. For the 
purpose of this study only tests of Sentence Comprehension, Word Reading, and Spelling were 
included using the Blue Form.  
During the Word Reading subtest, participants are handed a Word Reading List of 55 
words and asked to read aloud each word. The researcher follows along on the test form, giving 
one point for each word read correctly. The number of words read correctly on this subtest is 
then used to determine the starting point for the Sentence Comprehension subtest. During the 
Sentence Comprehension subtest, participants silently read each sentence from the Sentence 
Comprehension Card and provide an oral response to fill in the blank with a word that best 
completes the meaning of the sentence. One mark is given for each correct item administered, as 
well as all items before the first item administered (e.g., if the participant starts at item 30, then 
they are given credit for the first 29 items). During the Spelling subtest, participants are asked to 
spell words that are read aloud to them by the researcher. The researcher pronounces the word, 
reads it in a sentence, and pronounces it again. One point is awarded for each correctly spelled 
word. For all three subtests, accuracy was recorded and grade equivalencies, as well as percentile 
rankings, were obtained. 
The Trail Making Test. (TMT; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) was used as a measure 
of visual search, scanning, processing speed, and cognitive flexibility. Although there are five 
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conditions of the TMT, only conditions 2 (Number Sequencing) and 4 (Number-Letter 
Switching) were administered. In both conditions of this test, participants are presented with an 
11x17 display of randomly distributed numbers and letters. In Condition 2, participants are asked 
to connect all of the numbers in ascending order, as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Participants are also instructed to keep their pencils on the page throughout the task and are 
corrected by the examiner if a mistake is made. In Condition 4, participants are asked to alternate 
between connecting numbers in ascending order and letters in alphabetical order (e.g., 1, A, 2, B, 
etc.). Throughout both conditions completion times are recorded and errors are documented. 
 Questionnaire-based measures.  
 The Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE; Reniers, Corcoran, 
Drake, Shryane & Vollm, 2011) is a 31-item self-report questionnaire that consists of five 
subscales, which make up two components of empathy (affective and cognitive). The Affective 
empathy dimension includes three subscales, Emotion Contagion, Proximal Responsivity and 
Peripheral Responsivity, and is designed to assess responsivity to others’ emotions and the 
ability to spontaneously experience others’ emotions. The Cognitive empathy dimension 
includes two subscales, Perspective Taking and Online Simulation, and is designed to assess 
comprehension of others’ emotions. Participants are asked to rate their agreement with each 
statement on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). Research has 
demonstrated good reliability estimates across the five subscales, with alpha levels ranging from 
.75 to .91 (Michaels et al., 2014).2 
The Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Adult Version. (BRIEF-A; Roth, 
Isquith, & Gioia, 2005) was included as a measure of self-reported executive function. The 
                                                
2 Internal consistency levels fall within this range across all of the subscales, except for the Peripheral Responsivity 
subscale, which has been found to have a lower alpha level of .42. 
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BRIEF-A is a 75-item self-report test that consists of two broad indexes (Behavioral Regulation, 
BRI, and the Metacognitive Index, MI), which make up an overall score (Global Execute 
Composite, GEC). The BRI is made up of four scales (Inhibit, Shift, Emotional Control, and 
Self-Monitor), whereas the MI consists of five scales (Initiate, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, 
Task Monitor, and Organization of Materials). The BRIEF-A also includes three validity scales 
(Negativity, Infrequency, and Inconsistency) to aid in determining the interpretability of scores. 
Raw scores are calculated for each scale, indices, and the global composite. These raw scores are 
then compared to a normative sample and transformed into T-scores. Cronbach alpha 
coefficients for the BRIEF-A range from 0.93 to 0.96 for GEC, BRI, and MI scores (Roth et al., 
2005). 
The HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised. (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee & Ashton, 2004) is 
a self-report personality assessment that consists of six domains including Honesty-Humility, 
Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. 
From these six domains, 25 facet-level scales can be computed. The Honesty-Humility domain 
captures one’s tendency to disregard rules, engage in lavish and indulgent activities, and 
manipulate others for personal advantage, with higher scores reflecting a relative disinterest in 
these tendencies. High scores in the Emotionality domain reflect one’s tendency to be fearful and 
anxious in response to stressors and to exhibit a strong emotional attachment to, and dependence 
towards, others. The Extraversion domain assesses one’s tendency to seek out social interactions 
and feel positive and energetic when engaging in social activities, while high scores in the 
Agreeableness domain scores reflect one’s tendency to forgive others, withhold judgment, and 
easily cooperate with peers. The Conscientiousness domain assesses one’s tendency to be 
organized, goal-driven, and precise/calculated in decision-making, and high scores in the 
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Openness domain reflect curiosity, imagination, and a genuine interest in unconventional 
perspectives and ideas (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Respondents are asked to indicate their agreement 
or disagreement with various statements, such as, "I like to watch television" or "I often go for 
walks". The HEXACO-PI-R takes approximately 15 minutes to complete and consists of 100 
questions in total. The HEXACO-PI-R exhibits good reliability, as Cronbach’s alphas range from 
.72 to .81 (Romero, Villar, & López-Romero, 2015). Cronbach alphas for the facet-level scales 
are much lower, however, they demonstrate good test–retest reliabilities within the .60 to .70 
range (Romero et al., 2015). 
The Everyday Living Demographic Questionnaire. (ELQ; Good, 2008; Brock 
University, NCR Lab) was used to collect self-reported demographic information including age, 
sex, medical history, history of mild head injury, athletic/recreational history, level of education, 
and sleep habits. This 66-item questionnaire contains the item that assesses MHI status, which 
states, “Have you ever sustained an injury to your head with a force sufficient to alter your 
consciousness (e.g., dizziness, vomiting, seeing stars, or loss of consciousness, or confusion)?” 
Participants who respond “Yes” to this question are categorized as having a history of MHI. 
Participants who respond “Yes” to this question are also prompted to provide further details 
regarding their injury and these items are used to create a composite variable of head injury 
severity.3 The ELQ also includes a number of demographic questions unrelated to head injury to 
distract participants from the variables of primary interest and to allow for comparisons with 
                                                
3 The following self-reported items were used to calculate the Injury Severity Composite: previous MHI [no = 0, yes 
= 1], symptoms lasting more than 20 minutes [no = 0, yes = 1], loss of consciousness [no = 0, yes = 1], duration of 
LOC [less than 5 minutes = 1, less than 30 minutes = 2, less than 24 hours = 3, less than 1 week = 4, less than 1 
month = 5, greater than 1 month = 6], whether the injury resulted in concussion [no = 0, yes = 1], if stitches were 
required [no = 0, yes = 1], if the he/she received medical treatment [no = 0, yes = 1], if he/she was admitted to the 
hospital [no = 0, yes = 1], and whether he/she had sustained multiple head injuries [no = 0, yes = 1]. Similar items 
were included for the second injury listed on the ELQ. Scores on each of these items were added up, creating 
composite scores that ranged from 0 to 22. 
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previous research conducted in the NCR Lab at Brock University. Notably, items pertaining to 
athletic history (i.e., subconcussive exposure) and MHI status are embedded among other items 
about recreational activities and medical history. In addition, the ELQ contains a modified 
version of the Post-Concussion Symptom Scale (PCS; derived from Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, 
Brantley, & Cutlip, 1992) consisting of 10 symptom items (e.g., headache, nausea, dizziness, 
etc.) associated with a post-concussive state. For each symptom, participants are asked to assess 
the frequency from 1 (not at all) to 5 (all of the time), intensity from 1 (not at all) to 5 (crippling), 
and duration from 1 (not at all) to 5 (constant).  
Subconcussive impact exposure (SIE) composite variable. A SIE composite variable was 
created using individual athletic information embedded in the ELQ. For each time period 
examined (i.e., elementary school, high school, and university), participants were asked about 
their involvement in athletics and were instructed to list up to a maximum of four sports 
activities. Based on the responses provided (i.e., the number, and type, of sports), a SIE score 
was calculated for each participant, ranging from zero to 105 (i.e., higher values indicate greater 
exposure levels). For a more detailed account of the SIE composite variable and its scoring refer 
to Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Indicators of Exposure and Scoring of the Subconcussive Impact Exposure Composite (SIE) 
SIE Indicators 
Scoring (total ranges from 0-105) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Elementary School         
 Sports played (can list up to 4) N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Top ranked sport N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Participation per week (hrs) N/A < 0.5 < 3 < 6 < 9 <12 < 20 > 20 
High School         
 Sports played (can list up to 4) N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Top ranked sport N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Participation per week (hrs) N/A < 0.5 < 3 < 6 < 9 <12 < 20 > 20 
University         
 Sports played (can list up to 4) N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Top ranked sport N/A LR/R LR/C HR/R HR/C    
 Participation per week (hrs) N/A < 0.5 < 3 < 6 < 9 <12 < 20 > 20 
 Last time played (months; for 
up to 4 listed) 
N/A > 10 5-10 2-5 1-2 < 1 current  
Note: LR = low-risk sport, HR = high-risk sport, R = recreational sporting league, and C = 
competitive sporting league. 
 
In the current sample, SIE scores ranged from 3 to 75 (M = 34.55, SD = 14.70). Notably, 
mean SIE scores were lowest for non-athletes (M = 28.25), followed by low-risk athletes (38.83) 
and high-risk athletes (47.87). Similarly, mean SIE scores were higher for those who endorsed a 
history of MHI across both males and females. Tables 6 and 7 provide a more detailed summary 
of SIE scores in the current sample.  
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Table 6 
SIE Score Ranges and Descriptive Statistics for each Athletic Group  
  Athletic Status  
 Non-athlete Low-risk Athlete High-risk Athlete 
Score Range 3-50  18-61  35-75 
Mean (SD) 28.25 (12.83) 38.83 (13.15) 47.87 (10.92) 
 
Table 7 
SIE Score Ranges for Males and Females by Head Injury Status 
Sex MHI No MHI 
Male 17-60 (44.6) 14-75 (37.7)  
Female 9-61 (37.2) 3-50 (28.8) 
Note: Values included in the table represent the minimum and maximum SIE scores for each 
demographic category and the mean SIE scores in brackets. 
Theory of mind assessments. 
Modified Interpersonal Reactivity Index. (IRI; Davis, 1980) is a 28-item, self-report test 
that was designed to measure empathy and theory of mind. The IRI consists of four subscales 
(Perspective-taking, Personal Distress, Fantasy, and Empathic Concern), each containing seven 
items. The Perspective-taking subscale measures the ability to consider or understand others’ 
perspectives (thoughts or feelings), the Personal Distress scale measures the degree to which 
participants experiences the negative emotions of others, the Fantasy Scale measures the ability 
to envision the self as an imagined character in fictional stories, and lastly, the Empathic 
Concern scale measures the ability to empathize with others. Participants are instructed to rate 
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each item on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (does not describe me well) to 4 (describes me very 
well). This questionnaire was modified for the purpose of the current study; statements were not 
altered, but those statements that included other constructs of empathy unrelated to ToM and 
those that were ambivalent in regards to their affective content were excluded (e.g., “I sometimes 
feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation”). Previous investigations 
utilizing the full IRI scale have demonstrated good reliability (standardized alpha coefficients: 
[Fantasy scale] males = .78, females = .79; [Perspective-Taking scale] males = .71, females = 
.75; [Empathic Concern scale] males = .68, females = .73; [Personal Distress scale] males = .77, 
females = .75).  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a measure 
of ToM that requires participants to determine the mental state of a target by looking at an image 
of his/her eyes. The revised adult version is comprised of 36 black-and-white photographs of 
only the eye region of the face. Each set of eyes is presented along with four mental state terms 
(two words presented above the image and two below) and participants are asked to circle the 
word that best depicts the target’s thoughts or feelings. Only one word may be selected for each 
image and participants are encouraged to respond as quickly as possible. If participants are not 
familiar with any of the terms listed, they are instructed to refer to a printed glossary that 
provides definitions for all response options.4 In the current study, a computerized version of this 
test was used, permitting the researchers to record reaction time for each of the 36 responses.  
Perspective-Taking Task. (PTT; Good & Gallant, 2016; Brock University, NCR Lab) is 
a computerized performance-based task consisting of 16 written scenarios designed for the 
                                                
4 It should be noted that although participants were provided with this option, behavioural observations from 
researchers indicated that very few referred to the glossary (approximately 5 participants in total). This suggests that 
perhaps university students are already familiar with such terminology, in contrast to other populations that have 
previously been tested on the RMET. 
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purpose of this study. These scenarios were based on those used by Hynes and colleagues (2006) 
and were adapted to increase the difficulty level for university students. Throughout this task, 
participants are presented with a series of scenarios depicting a variety of characters engaged in 
social interactions. Each scenario is designed such that the participant must determine the mental 
state of a target character within a social context. Eight of the scenarios require participants to 
determine the cognitive state of the target, while the other eight involve affective states, forming 
two subscales (a cognitive subscale and an affective subscale). Each scenario is presented to 
participants independently along with a generalized prompt (e.g., “Jason gives himself up 
because…”). Once participants have read the scenario in full, they must click on a button on the 
screen that reads “Show Statement”. Participants are then presented with a series of response 
options corresponding to the prompt and are instructed to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale 
how likely the response is from “very unlikely” (1), to “very likely” (7). Each of the four 
response options per scenario appears independently and its appearance is under the control of 
the participant (i.e., will only appear once participants click “Next Statement”). For each 
response, the time from the presentation of the response option to the response selection (e.g., a 
rating from 1 to 7) is recorded, providing a measure of reaction time. For the purpose of this 
study, scenarios were presented in one of two random orders (RO1 or RO2), with an equal 
number of participants receiving each. For a complete list of all PTT scenarios and response 
options, see Appendix A.  
Procedure 
 Following approval from the Brock University Research Ethics Board (#15-324), 
participants were tested individually by one of four researchers (two female and two male) or the 
primary investigator. Each researcher was trained in the administration of both the 
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neuropsychological measures and the electrophysiological measures. Each testing session was 
approximately two hours in duration and was completed in the Jack and Nora Walker Lifespan 
Development Centre testing facilities at Brock University.  
Upon arrival, the informed consent form was read aloud to the participant by the 
researcher and the participant was given the opportunity to ask any questions. Each participant 
began the testing session by rating his/her current state of arousal on a 10-point scale (i.e., “On a 
scale from one to 10, with one being very relaxed and 10 being very stressed, how are you 
currently feeling?”). Next, the participant’s blood pressure was taken using a blood pressure cuff 
that was attached to the participant’s non-dominant arm. Afterwards, the participant removed the 
cuff and the researcher demonstrated how to complete the placement of the physiological activity 
recording equipment. To reduce physical contact between the researcher and the participant, the 
participant then independently completed the placement of the recording equipment (unless the 
participant requested assistance) to collect heart rate, EDA and respiratory rates. Then, a three-
minute baseline measure was taken. After this, the PTT protocol was described to the participant 
and he/she was informed that physiological indices would be acquired throughout the task. The 
participant was seated in front of a computer monitor, on which the PTT was projected from a 
MacBook Laptop facing the researcher. This allowed the participant to complete the PTT at 
his/her own pace (the on-screen duration of each scenario and response option was under the 
control of the participant), while the researcher observed his/her performance on the MacBook 
and inserted response markers in the Polygraph Professional program on the Acer Laptop. The 
participant indicated his/her rating for each response option using a computer mouse attached to 
the MacBook Laptop and continued until an alert appeared on the screen stating, “End of Task”. 
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Subsequently, another 3-minute recording was taken, after which the physiological equipment 
was removed by the participant.  
Following the PTT, the participant completed the RMET using the same computer 
monitor and mouse. After the participant’s RMET data was saved, a series of neuropsychological 
tests were administered in a constant order, including the WRAT-IV (Word Reading, Spelling, 
then Sentence Comprehension) and the two conditions of the TMT. Prior to administration, the 
participant was reminded that his/her performance on all tasks will be kept confidential and that 
the tasks are intentionally challenging. Lastly, the participant was provided with a set of paper 
and pencil questionnaires to complete. The administration order was held constant across 
participants: QCAE, BRIEF-A, IRI, and the ELQ. All participants were debriefed and when 
applicable, research participation credits were granted as an honorarium for their time. 
Data Analyses 
All analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; 
Version 22, 2014). A statistical significance level of p £ 0.05 was used for all analyses, however, 
values approaching statistical significance (i.e., p < .10) are also discussed. In the current study 
results are presented without sex as a covariate, as sex is confounded with the effect of SIE (i.e., 
a disproportionate number of males reported having participated in high-risk sports and comprise 
the majority of the MHI group). Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) were used to examine the 
effects of head injury status (MHI, No MHI) and a dichotomous SIE variable (median split; low, 
high) on the primary dependent variables of interest (PTT performance [accuracy, average 
ratings, and reaction time], physiological indices, RMET performance [accuracy and reaction 
time], and IRI scores). In addition, multiple hierarchical regressions were conducted to predict 
similar ToM outcomes from SIE and the injury severity composite. 
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Results 
Univariate/Multivariate Assumptions 
All relevant statistical assumptions have been examined and have been met, unless stated 
otherwise. In the event that any of the assumptions of the tests employed were violated, analyses 
were conducted using non-parametric procedures, such as the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficient, the Mann-Whitney Test, and the Kruskal-Wallis Test. Assumptions of Normality 
(examined via histograms and box-plots), Homogeneity of Variance (Levene’s test), Sphericity 
(Mauchly’s test), and Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices (Box’s M test) were examined for all 
ANOVA tests. Assumptions of Linearity (examined via scatterplots and residual plots), 
Homoscedasticity (residual plots), and Normality of Residuals (residual plots) were examined for 
all multivariate analyses. Any cases that were influential in determining the significance of 
results were excluded from relevant analyses. 
Neuropsychological Measures 
To ensure that general intellectual functioning and academic performance did not differ 
as a function of SIE, athletic status, or MHI neuropsychological measures were administered. 
Pearson-r correlations were conducted between SIE and raw scores on the WRAT-4. No 
significant relationships were observed for Word Reading, r(75) = -.09, p = .451, Spelling, r(75) 
= -.19, p = .09, or Sentence Comprehension, r(75) = -.12, p = .309.5 In addition, when examined 
as a function of athletic and MHI status, no differences were found between non-athletes, low-
risk, and high-risk athletes in Word Reading, F(2, 71) = .491, p = .614, Sentence 
                                                
5 The distribution of scores for the Sentence Comprehension subtest of the WRAT-4 violated the assumption of 
normality; thus, results were confirmed using a Spearman’s rho coefficient to examine its relationship with SIE 
scores [rs(75) = .10, p = .384], a Kruskal-Wallis test to examine differences in performance as a function of athletic 
status [χ2(2) = 2.60, p = .273], and a Mann-Whitney U-test to examine differences in performance as a function of 
head injury status [p = .008].  
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Comprehension, or Spelling, F(2, 71) = 1.63, p = .203. Similarly, Word Reading and Spelling 
raw scores were not found to differ as a function of MHI status (p < .05); however, Sentence 
Comprehension significantly differed between MHI (M = 46.00, SD = 2.72) and no-MHI (M = 
43.24, SD = 4.61) groups, χ2(2) = 2.60, p = .273, such that those with a MHI performed better.6  
Hypothesis 1: Self-reported Subconcussive Impact Exposure  
 A 2 (MHI status) x 3 (athletic status) ANOVA indicated a main effect of head injury, 
F(1, 71) = 4.15, p = .045, η2 = .055, such that those who reported a history of MHI (M = 40.19, 
SE = 13.56) had greater SIE scores compared to those who did not (M = 30.50, SD = 14.29; see 
Figure 1). There was also a main effect of athletic status, F(2, 71) = 12.95, p = .000, η2 = .267. A 
post-hoc analysis (Bonferroni) revealed that although high-risk (M = 47.87, SD = 10.92) and 
low-risk athletes (M = 38.83, SD = 13.15) did not significantly differ, p = .114, means were in 
the expected direction.7 Both low- and high-risk athletes produced greater SIE scores than non-
athletes (M = 28.25, SD = 12.83), p < .01. Figure 2 depicts SIE scores as a function of athletic 
status.  
 
Figure 1. Subconcussive impact exposure by self-reported history of mild head injury (*p <.05; 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean). 
                                                
6 Further analyses revealed that this effect was not due to a significant interaction between MHI status and education 
level; those with a MHI did not report higher levels of education than their no-MHI counterparts.    
7 A Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis was also computed, revealing a similar, nonsignificant result, p = .094. 
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Figure 2. Subconcussive impact exposure by self-reported top-ranked university sport. 
(**p <.01; Error bars represent standard errors of the mean). 
 
 
In addition, as observed in Table 8, a significant positive correlation was observed 
between SIE and injury severity8 demonstrating increasing injury severity is associated with 
increasing subconcussive exposure. SIE was also positively correlated with MHI and the number 
of self-reported head injuries showing that greater SIE is associated with a greater number of 
head injuries.  
Table 8 
Pearson Correlations between Subconcussive Impact Exposure (SIE) Composite and Head 
Injury Variables (N=77) 
 
 
 
                                                
8 A non-parametric Spearman correlation was also computed and similar results were observed [rs(75) = .436, p = 
.000]. 
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Hypotheses 2 and 3: ToM as a Function of SIE  
 Self-reported ToM (IRI). A 2 (MHI status) x 2 (subscale; cognitive, affective) mixed 
ANOVA showed no main effect of MHI status, F(1, 75) = .767, p > .05, η2 = .010, or interaction, 
and a trending main effect of subscale, F(1, 75) = .3.35, p = .071, η2 = .043, such that cognitive 
subscale scores (M = 2.76, SD = .69) were greater than affective subscale scores (M = 2.65, SD = 
.58) regardless of MHI status. However, further analyses revealed that scores on the Social Self-
Esteem subscale of the HEXACO were significantly correlated with overall ToM scores on the 
IRI, r(77) = .251, p < .05, showing that higher social self-esteem is associated with increased 
ToM. Interestingly, social self-esteem was also significantly correlated with MHI status, r(77) = 
.297, p < .01, such that those with a history of MHI demonstrated higher social self-esteem than 
their no-MHI peers.  
Consequently, data was analyzed as a function of MHI status in order to examine the 
relationship between social self-esteem and ToM within each head injury group. Within the no-
MHI cohort, social self-esteem significantly predicted total IRI scores accounting for 8.8% of the 
variance, β = .297, F(1, 43) = 4.17, p < .05; those with higher social self-esteem reported higher 
levels of ToM. In contrast, social self-esteem did not significantly predict ToM in the MHI group 
(p = .560) indicating that the relationship between social self-esteem and ToM only exists in the 
normative population. Figures 3 and 4 depict the relationship between social self-esteem and 
overall ToM within the two head injury status groups.  
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 61 
 
Figure 3. Modified Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; self-report ToM) scores as a function of 
Social Self-Esteem scores on the HEXACO-PI-R in the no-MHI group (p <.05). 
 
Figure 4. Modified Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; self-report ToM) scores as a function of 
Social Self-Esteem scores on the HEXACO-PI-R in the MHI group (p =.560). 
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Consistent with what was observed in the MHI cohort, regression analyses conducted 
separately within the two SIE groups (low vs. high), regressing overall ToM scores on the IRI on 
social self-esteem scores demonstrated that the relationship between SIE and social self-esteem 
only exists in the low SIE group, F(1, 39) = 4.979 p < .05.9   
 RMET performance. RMET scores were relatively normally distributed (Figure 5) and 
performance was high across the MHI and no-MHI group, with mean scores of 26 out of 36 
images (≈71%) for both groups (scores ranged from 16 to 34; SD = 4.16). Further examination of 
all 36 images revealed that performance across some images was near ceiling (e.g., > 92% of 
participants answered correctly); thus, in order to capture subtle differences between groups, a 
revised RMET total was calculated, eliminating all images for which greater than 75% of 
participants answered correctly.10  
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) total scores (N = 77).  
                                                
9 The aforementioned analyses were computed as moderation analyses, using head injury status/SIE status as a 
moderator of the relationship between social self-esteem and overall ToM performance on the IRI. However, results 
were not significant (MHI x social self-esteem: b = -.430, p =.515; SIE x social self-esteem: b = -.653, p =.269). 
10 The following images remained in the revised RMET: 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 35. 
The final revised RMET included 16 images total and accuracy scores were computed as the percentage of correctly 
answered items out of 16.  
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Notably, in the current sample, both the original RMET scores and the revised RMET 
scores were not significantly correlated with other measures of affective reasoning, such as the 
IRI or QCAE (a measure of empathy), or the injury severity composite (p’s > .05). 
Unexpectedly, however, a significant relationship between scores on the Sentence 
Comprehension subtest of the WRAT4 and the RMET was observed, r(77) = .441, p < .001, such 
that higher scores on the Sentence Comprehension subtest were associated with greater accuracy 
across the 36 images. Table 9 provides further details regarding all correlation values and 
significance levels.11  Importantly, the relationship between Sentence Comprehension and RMET 
performance was similar across both RMET scales examined (original and revised; r(77) = .291, 
p = .01) and this relationship did not differ as a function of head injury status (see Figure 6)12 
such that the RMET might be capturing a construct distinct from mentalizing. As a result, no 
further analyses examining RMET performance as a function of MHI or SIE status were 
computed.  
Table 9 
Pearson Correlations between the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) and other relevant 
variables (N=77) 
 
                                                
11 Analyses were also computed using a Spearman rho correlation, given the skewness of Sentence Comprehension 
scores; similar results were observed for the original and revised scale [rs(77) = .441, p = .000 and rs(77) = .307, p = 
.007, respectively].  
12 When groups were examined independently, the relationship between WRAT4 Sentence Comprehension and the 
original RMET scores was significant in both the MHI and no-MHI cohort (R2 = .191 and R2 = .231 respectively). 
 RMET (original total)  RMET (revised total) 
Variables r p (2-tailed)  r p (2-tailed) 
IRI total .010 .992  .044 .705 
Modified IRI total .001 .929  .019 .872 
QCAE total -.053 .648  -.063 .589 
Injury Severity .000 .998  -.093 .419 
Sentence Comprehension  .441 .000  .291 .010 
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Figure 6. Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMET) scores as a function of Sentence 
Comprehension performance on the Wide Range Achievement Test 4 (WRAT4) 
 
PTT performance.  PTT performance was evaluated in two ways: average ratings (from 
1 [very unlikely] to 7 [very likely]) and average reaction time across correct and incorrect 
response options for the two types of scenarios (cognitive and affective).  
Rating Data. Average ratings were relatively normally distributed for both correct 
cognitive and affective responses;13 however, a slight negative skew (skewness = -.63) was 
evident in the affective distribution whereby the majority of ratings were closer to the upper 
range of the rating scale (Figures 7 and 8). As observed, there was considerable variability in 
performance across participants with correct ratings ranging from 4.5 to 7 for correct cognitive 
scenario responses (M = 6.05, SD = .468) and from 4.9 to 7 for correct affective scenario 
responses (M = 6.19, SD = .494).  
                                                
13 Current findings exclude Participant 123 who was found to be a significant outlier in terms of PTT ratings (e.g., 
greater than 3SD below the mean).   
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Figure 7. Distribution of Perspective-taking Task ratings for correct cognitive responses (N = 76) 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Perspective-Taking Task ratings for correct affective responses (N = 
76) 
 Rating data for incorrect response options demonstrated a similar pattern, as both 
distributions were relatively normal (Figures 9 and 10). Performance across participants for 
incorrect cognitive ratings ranging from 1.56 to 5.33 (M = 3.68, SD = .736) and from 3.09 to 
5.82 for affective ratings (M = 4.2, SD = .494). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
4.50 5.50 5.88 6.25 6.63 7.00
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Average	Rating	(1-7)	Across	all	Correct	Responses	on	the	PTT
Cognitive	Scenarios
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
4.88 5.25 5.75 6.13 6.50 6.88
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Average	Rating	(1-7)	Across	all	Correct	Responses	on	the	PTT
Affective	Scenarios
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 66 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of Perspective-Taking Task ratings for incorrect cognitive responses (N = 
76) 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of Perspective-taking Task ratings for incorrect affective responses (N = 
76) 
 Given that performance was relatively high across all participants, an item-by-item 
analysis was conducted to examine variability across the four possible response options; two 
scenarios were identified as having approximately equivalent average ratings for correct and 
incorrect responses. That is, scenarios 2 and 16 exhibited poor discrimination, whereby the 
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scenario was too difficult or the incorrect distractors were perceived as correct (i.e., mean rating 
for option a) [correct] = 5.9 and mean rating for option d) [incorrect] = 5.7). As a result, these 
scenarios were removed from the final version of the task and all analyses. Variability across 
responses for the remaining scenarios was relatively stable, thus, analyses for the PTT were 
based on a set of 14 scenarios (7 cognitive and 7 affective). Table 10 contains descriptive 
statistics for the final set of scenarios.  
 
Table 10 
Average ratings on the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) by type of response option and scenario 
(N=76) 
 Cognitive  Affective 
 Correct Incorrect  Correct Incorrect 
Range 4.43 - 7.0 1.76 - 4.95  4.86 - 7.0 2.57 - 4.81 
Mean (SD) 6.07 (0.47) 3.36 (0.61)  6.28 (0.47) 3.70 (0.47) 
 
To evaluate the concurrent validity of the PTT, the relationship between ratings on the 
PTT and other measures of ToM (e.g., IRI, RMET) was evaluated. Further, PTT ratings were 
examined with demographic information. While ratings for incorrect response options did not 
show a significant relationship with the Modified IRI, ratings for correct response options 
exhibited a statistically significant relationship with the total and both subscales of the Modified 
IRI, such that higher PTT ratings for correct responses were associated with higher self-reported 
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ToM (Table 10).14 Moreover, there was no relationship between correct ratings and Revised 
RMET scores or RMET reaction time data; however, a significant negative relationship was 
observed between total ratings for incorrect responses and incorrect cognitive responses and 
Revised RMET scores, whereby those who rated incorrect responses as lower had higher 
Revised RMET scores. In terms of demographics, none of the PTT ratings were found to be 
significantly related to gender or education level.  
 
Table 10 
 Relationship Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) average ratings, demographic variables, and ToM 
measures (N=75). 
 
                                                
14 Participants 123 and 153 were excluded from the following analyses, as they were found to be greater than 3 
standard deviations from the mean for correct and incorrect ratings, and results were trending when included but 
reached significance when excluded. 
 PTT Correct  PTT Incorrect 
 Cognitive 
 
Affective 
 
Cognitive 
 
Affective 
Variables r p  r p  r p  r p 
Modified IRI total .264 .022  .295 .010  -.007 .953  .009 .939 
Modified IRI cognitive  .383 .001  .351 .002  -.136 .245  .-.024 .840 
Modified IRI affective  .198 .089  .246 .033  .036 .759  .019 .873 
Revised RMET total .120 .303  .010 .929  -.243 .036  -.176 .130 
RMET reaction time  .111 .344  .164 .160  -.034 .772  -.101 .390 
Gender .093 .429  .023 .848  -.136 .245  -.029 .802 
Education .073 .537  -.007 .951  .031 .793  .030 .802 
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A series of 2 x 2 mixed ANOVAs were conducted with scenario type (cognitive vs. 
affective) as a within-subjects factor, and head injury status (No-MHI vs. MHI) as a between-
subjects factor to examine differences in average ratings for both correct and incorrect response 
options. Average ratings for both correct and incorrect response options did not produce 
significant differences between the no-MHI and MHI groups and no significant interactions were 
found (see Figure 11). A main effect of scenario type was found for correct responses, F(1, 73) = 
16.53, p < .001, η2 = .185 and incorrect responses, F(1, 73) = 53.06, p < .001, η2 = .421, whereby 
ratings were higher for affective scenarios, regardless of MHI status. Similar results were found 
using the dichotomous SIE variable.  
 
Figure 11. Average ratings for correct and incorrect response options depicted as a function of 
head injury status and scenario type (N=75; *p < .05). 
 
 Regression analyses were conducted to examine the effect of injury severity in predicting 
PTT ratings. Results from the regression analyses indicated a trending effect of injury severity on 
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overall correct ratings across both scenarios, F(1, 73) = 3.75, p = .057. Interestingly, further 
analyses revealed that an effect of injury severity was only found for affective scenario responses 
(β = -.244; F (1, 73) = 4.624, p = .035), whereby greater injury severity was associated with 
lower ratings for correct affective response options. Injury severity was not predictive of ratings 
for correct cognitive responses (β = -.140; F (1, 73) = 1.47, p = .230). Figure 12 depicts these 
findings across the two types of scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 12. Average ratings for correct response options for affective and cognitive scenarios as a 
function of Injury Severity (n = 75). 
 
Further, in the MHI cohort, injury severity accounted for 11.4% of the variance in ratings 
for correct affective responses (β = -.34), but only 5% of the variance in ratings for correct 
cognitive responses (β = -.214). Figure 13 depicts this relationship between correct ratings and 
injury severity in the MHI cohort. Injury severity was not found to be predictive of average 
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ratings for incorrect response options across both types of scenarios, and similar analyses 
computed using SIE as a predictor yielded non-significant results. 
 
 
Figure 13. Average ratings for correct response options for affective scenarios as a function of 
injury severity in the MHI cohort (n = 31). 
 
Reaction Time Data. Average reaction times across all 14 scenarios were normally 
distributed (Skew = 0.353; Kurtosis = 0.273), with a mean of 5.41 seconds (scores ranged from 
2.6 to 8.5; SD = 1.06).15 As observed in Figure 14, overall reaction times did not significantly 
differ between those with a history of MHI (M = 5.57, SD = .013) and those without (M = 5.29, 
SD = .082), t(73) = -1.124, p = .265. Further, across any of the reaction time variables examined 
(e.g., reaction time for cognitive vs. affective scenarios, reaction time for correct vs. incorrect 
                                                
15 Participants 154 and 158 were excluded from reaction time analyses as they were found to be greater than 3SD 
above the mean and were contributing significantly to negative skewness.  
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responses), there was no main effect of, or interaction with, head injury status or subconcussion 
(high, low) status (p’s > .05). Further, regression analyses demonstrated that injury severity and 
SIE did not have any detrimental effects on reaction time for correct, incorrect, cognitive, or 
affective scenarios.  
  
Figure 14. Average reaction time across all scenarios of the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) by 
self-reported history of mild head injury (p >.05; Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Baseline Arousal as a Function of SIE 
To illustrate the continuum of head injury severity, physiological arousal was first 
examined in terms of head injury status. There were no significant differences in participants’ 
subjective self-report arousal between the MHI and no-MHI groups, t(75) = -4.31, p =.665. 
However, given that EDA is a sensitive index of autonomic nervous system (ANS) functioning 
(Lazarus, Speisman, & Mordkoff, 1963), EDA peak amplitude was used as an index of 
physiological arousal. This revealed an effect of head injury status, t(67.77) = 3.57, p < .01, η2 = 
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.114, such that the no-MHI group (M = .683, SD = .708) exhibited significantly higher baseline 
EDA amplitude compared to the MHI group (M = .238, SD = .366; See Figure 15).16 Further, 
regression analyses were conducted to examine physiological arousal as a function of injury 
Severity. As illustrated in Figure 16, EDA amplitude decreased significantly across increasing 
severity.  
 
Figure 15. Electrodermal activation (EDA) amplitude by self-reported history of mild head 
injury (**p <.01; Error bars represent standard errors of the mean). 
 
Figure 16. Electrodermal activation (EDA) amplitude (µS) as a function of injury severity.   
 
 
                                                
16 Participant 137 was excluded from analyses 3SD greater than mean – analyses were trending with inclusion and 
significant without. Further, given the skewness of the distribution of EDA values, results were confirmed with a 
Mann-Whitney U-Test [U = 373.5, p < .000]. 
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To address the fourth hypothesis, physiological arousal was regressed on SIE. This 
analysis revealed that SIE significantly predicted baseline EDA, F(1, 74) = 5.700, p < .05 (See 
Figure 17), such that higher scores on the SIE were associated with attenuated physiological 
arousal, b = -.267, 95% CI [-.021, -.002].  
 
Figure 17. Electrodermal activation (EDA) amplitude as a function of subconcussive impact 
exposure (SIE).   
Hypothesis 5: Physiological Arousal as a Mediator 
Lastly, it was anticipated that ToM reasoning for affective scenarios would depend on 
physiological arousal while reading, and in turn, those in the MHI group would be impaired due 
to physiological underarousal. In particular, it was expected that this would be reflected by a 
reduced capacity to discriminate among the correct and incorrect response options (i.e., correct 
ratings would not be rated as high, and incorrect ratings would not be rated as low, on the 7-point 
scale).  
To address this hypothesis, a 2 (head injury status; MHI, No-MHI) by 2 (scenario type; 
cognitive, affective) mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine differences in EDA as a function 
of head injury status while reading all scenarios. No significant effects were found for the main 
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effects of head injury status, F(68) = .559, p = .457 and scenario type, F(68) = .619, p = .434, 
and the interaction between head injury status and scenario type, F(68) = 2.201, p = .143. Figure 
18 depicts physiological arousal levels, indexed by EDA, while reading each of the seven 
affective scenarios during the testing session.17 As observed, means were in the expected 
direction, such that those with a history of MHI exhibited lower physiological arousal while 
reading. 
 
Figure 18. Measures of electrodermal activation (EDA) during the seven affective scenarios of 
the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) as a function head injury status (N =70). 
 
Pearson-r correlations were conducted by MHI group to examine the relationship 
between physiological arousal across the PTT and the average ratings participants gave to correct 
and incorrect response options for both affective and cognitive scenarios. These analyses 
                                                
17 Unfortunately, due to technical difficulties, physiological data during the PTT was lost for five participants (cases 
103, 110, 112, 113, and 137). Further, as mentioned previously, cases 123 and 153 were identified as significant 
outliers and were excluded from all analyses of PTT rating data; thus, for they were removed from the following 
analyses, resulting in a final sample size of 70 for all hypothesis 5 analyses.  
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revealed that EDA levels during affective scenarios of the PTT were predictive of ratings for 
affective scenarios only for the MHI group (See Table 11). No relationships were observed 
between physiological arousal and the ratings for affective scenarios in the No-MHI group. 
Similar correlation analyses were conducted for cognitive scenarios; however, no significant 
relationships were found across both head injury groups (Table 12), such that EDA while reading 
cognitive scenarios was not associated with performance. 
 
Table 11 
 Relationship between average ratings and physiological arousal for affective scenarios during 
the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) by MHI status (N=70). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Difference scores were calculated by taking the difference between average ratings for 
correct affective responses and average ratings for incorrect affective responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 MHI (n = 30)  No MHI (n = 40) 
 EDA Amplitude (µS)  EDA Amplitude (µS) 
Variables r p  r p 
Correct response ratings .350 .058  .003 .987 
Incorrect response ratings  -.411 .024  -.099 .542 
Difference scores .511 .004  .076 .641 
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Table 12 
 Relationship between average ratings and physiological arousal for cognitive scenarios during 
the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT) by MHI status (N=70). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Difference scores were calculated by taking the difference between average ratings for 
correct cognitive responses and average ratings for incorrect cognitive responses. 
 
A similar pattern of results was observed when linear regression analyses were conducted 
separately within the MHI cohorts examining whether EDA amplitude during affective scenarios 
would predict difference scores for affective responses. As expected, EDA significantly 
predicted PTT performance on affective scenarios only in the MHI group, b = 2.89, 95% CI 
[1.007, 4.776], accounting for 26.1% of the variance in difference scores compared to 0.6% in 
the no-MHI group, b = .092, 95% CI [-.306, .490]. Indeed, a linear regression examining this 
relationship across the whole sample was not significant, p = .348. Figures 19 and 20 highlight 
these results, depicting performance on affective scenarios as a function of physiological arousal. 
Furthermore, EDA during cognitive scenarios was not found to predict PTT performance in both 
the MHI and no-MHI group (p > .05).18  
                                                
18 Results were examined with and without outliers (Participants 123, 119, 138, and 121) and results remained the 
same. 
 MHI (n = 30)  No MHI (n = 40) 
 EDA Amplitude (µS)  EDA Amplitude (µS) 
Variables r p  r p 
Correct response ratings .180 .341  .152 .349 
Incorrect response ratings  -.018 .926  -.249 .121 
Difference scores .109 .566  .249 .6121 
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To further investigate this relationship, a meditation analysis was conducted examining 
whether physiological arousal would mediate the relationship between injury severity and 
affective ToM performance on the PTT. A mediation relationship was not found for 
physiological arousal between injury severity and affective difference scores. 
 
Figure 19. Relationship between difference scores for affective scenarios and electrodermal 
activation (EDA) amplitude by mild head injury (MHI) status. 
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Figure 20. Difference scores for affective scenario responses as a function of electrodermal 
activation (EDA) during affective scenarios of the Perspective-Taking Task (PTT; N =70). 
Discussion 
 While TBI has been reliably associated with impairments in socioemotional functioning 
(Hynes, Stone & Kelso, 2011), few studies have investigated the effects of repetitive 
subconcussive head injuries on social cognition. Moreover, subconcussions are regularly 
sustained in sports (e.g., Crisco et al., 2010), and have been associated with alterations in 
functional activity of the frontal cortex (Talavage et al., 2014). At the extreme end, 
subconcussions have also been linked to CTE – a neurodegenerative disease that is characterized 
by profound behavioural and emotional impairments, such as disinhibition, apathy, and 
emotional lability (Baugh et al., 2012). Despite these findings, subconcussion research has 
primarily targeted physical and cognitive outcomes without any effort to examine social 
integration and emotional well-being. This research, therefore, presents an important 
contribution to current knowledge, providing further insight on the progressive nature of 
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accumulated subconcussion, while specifically investigating the socioemotional consequences of 
repeated SIE. 
The aim of this study was to examine physiological arousal as a potential mediator of 
affective ToM performance in university students who have and have not been exposed to 
repetitive subconcussive impacts in athletics. Using a novel index of SIE derived from self-
reported athletic involvement (from elementary school forward), students with greater SIE 
showed lower baseline physiological arousal compared to those with less SIE. Similarly, 
previous findings from the MHI population were replicated (e.g., Baker & Good, 2014; van 
Noordt & Good, 2011), whereby physiological underarousal was observed as a function of MHI 
status and along a gradient of increasing injury severity (i.e., a greater number of indicators of 
injury severity, such as PTA, LOC, etc.). It was further demonstrated that these physiological 
changes after MHI are predictive of subtle differences in affective ToM performance on a 
computerized perspective-taking task. Specifically, although repeated SIE was not found to 
predict ToM impairments, a dissociation was observed in the MHI group between the cognitive 
and affective subcomponents of ToM, such that only affective ToM performance was predicted 
by physiological underarousal (i.e., attenuated EDA) during the PTT. In contrast, this 
relationship between physiological arousal and affective ToM performance was not observed in 
those without a history of MHI.  
Subconcussive Impact Exposure (SIE) Composite 
The investigation of SIE and its neuropsychological consequences has primarily been 
conducted using HITS in high-impact athletic activities (e.g., American football, hockey, etc.); 
while this approach is useful and provides a real-time record of the magnitude, frequency and 
location of impacts, it restricts the study of subconcussions to those in high-contact helmeted 
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sports. To examine exposure across all types of athletic activities and along a continuum of 
accumulated injury (e.g., even in those with no, or minimal, exposure), a novel measure of 
subconcussive exposure, the SIE composite, was developed using self-reported athletic 
information. Those who reported a history of MHI had greater SIE scores than their no-MHI 
peers, as expected given the spectrum of head injury severity (Iverson & Lange, 2009) and the 
proposed model of accumulated injury (Talavage et al., 2016), whereby the accumulation of 
subconcussions is a predictor of symptomatic injury, rather than the magnitude. Further, SIE was 
positively correlated with injury severity and the number of MHIs sustained over time. These 
findings illustrate that neurophysiological disruption accumulates with each successive impact, 
not only when a diagnosed or symptomatic injury is sustained. This aids in explaining individual 
differences in the incidence of MHI across athletes and the highly inconsistent estimates of MHI-
causing magnitudes across investigations (e.g., Breedlove et al., 2012; McCaffrey, Mihalik, 
Crowell, Shields, & Guskiewicz, 2007; Pellman et al., 2003). The observed relationship between 
accumulated subconcussion and MHI history and severity, therefore, provides support for a 
linear model of injury (Talavage et al., 2016) and further validates the SIE composite as a means 
of capturing subconcussion vulnerability. 
Given the emphasis on athletic history information, the hypothesis that individuals 
currently identifying as non-athletes would demonstrate lower SIE scores than those currently 
identifying as high- and low-risk athletes was confirmed; however, expected differences in SIE 
were not found between the low- and high-risk athletes. While research has demonstrated that 
high-risk athletes sustain a greater number of impacts in games and practices and are more 
susceptible to injury (McAllister et al., 2012; Killam, Cautin, & Santucci, 2005), the current 
findings do not invalidate the SIE composite as an index of repeated subconcussive exposure. 
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Alternatively, these findings indicate that the SIE composite is effectively capturing lifetime 
involvement, and exposure to subconcussions, in athletics. By classifying exposure along a 
continuum, the SIE composite demonstrates greater sensitivity and enables the detection of 
current non-athletes who may have participated in high-risk sports, and been exposed to 
subconcussions, prior to university. The common use of low-risk and non-contact athletes as 
control subjects for high-risk or contact athletes (e.g., McAllister et al., 2012; McAllister et al., 
2014) may, therefore, obscure or underestimate the effects of repetitive head trauma by failing to 
account for previous athletic involvement; any null conclusions drawn from this research warrant 
caution, as results from the current study imply that low-risk control groups may also have been 
subjected to the subtle effects of subconcussions. 
Physiological Arousal 
Consistent with previous literature demonstrating the vmPFC’s increased vulnerability in 
closed-head injury (Bigler & Orrison, 2001; Wallis, 2007) and previous findings from the NCR 
Lab (Baker & Good, 2014; van Noordt & Good, 2011), the present study revealed that head 
injuries of graded severity are reliably associated with attenuated physiological arousal. Not only 
did those with a history of MHI exhibit lower baseline physiological arousal compared to their 
no-MHI peers, but physiological arousal varied as a function of injury severity and SIE, such that 
more severe injuries and greater subconcussive exposure were associated with lower baseline 
EDA.  
Importantly, this study is one of the first to show changes in autonomic nervous system 
activity following asymptomatic head impacts, indicating that even exposure to subconcussive 
trauma through participation in high-risk, competitive sports is sufficient to produce measurable 
reductions in baseline activation. This pattern of attenuated EDA mirrors that observed following 
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focal damage to the vmPFC (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000) and is, therefore, thought to 
reflect subtle disruption to the vmPFC that has accrued over time through the accumulation of a 
number of subconcussive blows. The vmPFC’s bidirectional connections with subcortical 
structures, such as the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the hypothalamus (Kolb & Whishaw, 
2009) and its increased vulnerability to subconcussion in sport (Crisco et al., 2010), render it a 
likely candidate for the observed physiological changes. 
Following vmPFC damage, the ability to regulate and moderate physiological arousal 
cues according to environmental and cognitive demands is compromised (Bechara et al., 2000), 
resulting in impaired cognitive performance, as per the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908). Indeed, repeated subconcussive exposure over the course of a single season has been 
associated with cognitive impairments on ImPACT and the TMT (e.g., McAllister et al., 2012; 
Nauman et al., 2014). However, findings have been unreliable across investigations (Belanger et 
al., 2016; Broglio et al., 2011; Gysland et al., 2012) and many have argued that the damage 
caused by repetitive subconcussion can be repaired during intermittent periods of rest between 
athletic seasons (Talavage et al., 2016). Conversely, the current results indicate that accumulated 
trauma, whether early or late in an athlete’s career, has persistent physiological effects. Taken 
together, these conflicting findings appear to suggest that the cumulative effects of 
subconcussions are not sufficiently captured by cognitive measures; the decreased sensitivity of 
such tools may not account for compensatory strategies (e.g., Abbas et al., 2014) and an athlete’s 
cognitive reserve (Schneider, 1979). Alternatively, therefore, physiological indices may be a 
more reliable indicator of the persistent effects of accumulated subconcussion across an athlete’s 
entire career.  
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ToM Assessment After MHI 
The current study implemented three measures of ToM reasoning (one self-report and 
two performance-based) to examine the validity of each for the assessment of perspective-taking 
deficits in university students living with the effects of MHI and repetitive SIE. Overall, the 
results demonstrate that traditional measures of ToM may lack the sensitivity and specificity to 
detect the presence of subtle disruption in cognitively competent populations. As expected, 
however, the novel PTT designed to supplement traditional measures demonstrated considerable 
sensitivity to the effects of head injury on affective processing.  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The present findings indicate that in head-injured 
populations, other factors, aside from ToM capabilities, have a significant impact on self-report 
measures of ToM, such as the IRI. In particular, social self-esteem – a facet-level scale of the 
HEXACO-PI-R (Lee & Ashton, 2004) – significantly predicted ToM scores, but only for those 
without a history of MHI and those with low SIE. Social self-esteem, defined as the propensity to 
view oneself as likeable, popular and worthy, has previously been linked to ToM in the 
developmental literature (Cahill, Deater-Deckard, Pike, & Hughes, 2007). There is evidence to 
suggest that greater awareness and understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings increases 
sensitivity to criticism and praise, and subsequently, impacts social self-esteem (Cutting & Dunn, 
2002). Likewise, it is plausible that those with low social self-esteem may also feel that they are 
unable to understand others and may consequently rate their perspective-taking abilities as lower. 
The absence of an expected relationship between social self-esteem and IRI scores in the MHI 
population, and high SIE group, implies that individuals with a history of head injury are not as 
sensitive to others’ positive or negative mental states, and as a result, others’ mental states do not 
influence their self-perceptions. Indeed, consistent with the observed relationship between 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 85 
repeated SIE and physiological underarousal, results from the NCR lab have indicated that 
accumulated trauma limits one’s responsivity to environmental cues, as those with greater SIE 
are less self-conscious in the presence of others (Gallant & Good, 2016). 
Individuals with a history of head injury have also been shown to be less aware of 
internal cues and emotional states (Gallant & Good, 2016) and are often unable to reflect on their 
behaviour (Sherer, Hart, & Nick, 2003). While the self-assessment of perspective-taking may 
provide valuable insight into an inherently subjective process, as a self-report measure, the IRI is 
highly dependent on participants’ self-awareness and insight; low self-awareness has been found 
to significantly impact a participant’s ability to evaluate his/her own ToM reasoning (Bivona et 
al., 2013). In cases of severe TBI, this lack of awareness is termed anosognosia and represents a 
condition in which individuals are not aware of their neurological or neuropsychological 
impairments, despite intact cognition (Prigatano, 2005). Given the continuum of head injury 
severity (Iverson & Lange, 2009), low self-awareness could have impacted self-reports in the 
MHI and high SIE groups. Indeed, it was observed that even if an individual with a previous 
MHI rated him/herself as unpopular or disliked, this did not affect his/her ToM scores (e.g., 
he/she still rated him/herself as relatively good at inferring others’ mental states). In addition, 
similar inconsistencies were noted between IRI scores and other ToM-related self-report 
variables on the BRIEF-A, such as inhibition, self-monitoring and shifting, providing further 
evidence of limited self-awareness in the MHI group. Previous investigations have also failed to 
demonstrate impairments on the IRI after head injury (Bivona et al., 2013; Muller et al., 2010) 
and research in the NCR Lab has commonly found differences between participants’ self-
reported stress levels and autonomic activation (Baker & Good, 2015). Thus, the current findings 
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indicate that self-report measures of ToM may indeed be unreliable indices of social impairments 
for those living with the effects of head injury.  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). As previously discussed, the RMET is a 
widely-used measure of affective perspective-taking. Despite its relatively limited face validity, 
its effectiveness in capturing affective ToM impairments has been reliably demonstrated in 
populations with severe social challenges or neurological damage (e.g., Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, 
& Tranel, 2002). Its specificity to affective ToM, however, is unclear, as the possibility remains 
that the impairments observed after injury are reflective of deficits in domains beyond 
socioemotional functioning. As a result, the RMET’s validity as an assessment of affective ToM 
and its sensitivity to the presence of mild injury requires further investigation; the current study 
sought to achieve this aim.  
In the current sample, no differences in RMET scores were observed as a function of 
head injury status or severity, and RMET performance was relatively high across both the MHI 
and no-MHI groups. In fact, the mean score for the MHI group was 71% – a value very similar 
to those reported for typically-developing controls in previous investigations (e.g., Turkstra, 
2008; Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietswaart, and Summers, 2006; M = 79% and M = 70% 
respectively). Not surprisingly, ceiling effects are commonly observed when forced-choice tasks 
are administered to competent populations (e.g., Channon, Pellijeff, & Rule, 2005; Kalbe et al., 
2007); thus, a revised RMET scale was computed in the current study to eliminate all 
photographs whereby performance was near ceiling. Comparably, analyses computed using this 
revised scale revealed no significant differences in performance as a function of head injury 
status and severity.  
Interestingly, a strong positive correlation was noted between RMET scores (both the 
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original and the revised scores) and scores on the Sentence Comprehension subtest of the 
WRAT4, calling to question the relative contribution of vocabulary/language comprehension in 
RMET performance. Indeed, although it has not been directly examined, and despite attempts to 
eliminate vocabulary requirements by providing participants with definitions to all mental state 
terms, a similar relationship between RMET performance and IQ scores has been observed 
across a number of investigations (Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Kenyon et al., 2012; Stanford, 
Messinger, Malaspina, & Corcoran, 2011; Turkstra, 2008). For instance, when comparing 
patients with vmPFC and DLPFC lesions, Geraci, Surian, Ferraro, & Cantagallo (2010) found a 
strong correlation between the Eyes Test and performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(Heaton, Chelune, Curtiss, Kay, & Talley, 1993) – a widely used measure of executive function. 
Moreover, in the same study (Geraci et al., 2010), no differences were found between patient 
groups despite a large body of research implicating the vmPFC in affective ToM and the DLPFC 
in executive processes (Leopold et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, & Aharon-Peretz, 
2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005).  
In the current sample, the relationship between RMET and WRAT4 scores was robust to 
the effects of head injury as performance was significantly correlated with Sentence 
Comprehension across both head injury groups, further demonstrating that cognitive processes 
may play a greater role in RMET performance compared to affective ToM. Our findings of no 
relationship between RMET scores (original and revised) and other measures of ToM and 
empathy (e.g., IRI, PTT, and the QCAE) further support this notion and mimic findings from 
previous research comparing RMET performance to scores on other ToM measures (e.g., the 
Faux-pas task and the Strange stories test [Happé, 1994]) in healthy populations (Ahmed and 
Miller, 2011; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013). Consistent with this, research examining RMET 
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performance in psychopathic populations have found no significant impairments (Richell et al., 
2003), despite a substantial body of literature indicating that psychopaths are impaired in 
affective ToM and empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Thus, although objective 
performance-based measures are often considered more accurate in detecting differences in ToM 
(Bivona et al., 2013), there is a need to further investigate the utility of the RMET in capturing 
subtle variations in affective ToM reasoning in competent populations. Moreover, given that 
traditional ToM measures, such as the RMET, are often implemented to assess the concurrent 
validity of new assessment tools, results from the current study suggest that this approach may be 
misguided and warrants reevaluation.  
Perspective-Taking Task (PTT). The ability to infer the affective states of others is 
thought to depend on the internal simulation of others’ physiological states (Kalbe et al., 2007). 
In this process, autonomic arousal, reflective of others’ emotional states, is regulated and 
modulated by the vmPFC through its bidirectional connections with limbic structures (Kolb & 
Whishaw, 2009). Given that the vmPFC is particularly vulnerable to injury (Morales et al., 
2007), it was hypothesized that decrements would be observed in the affective, rather than 
cognitive, domain after MHI and repeated SIE. In line with expectations, it was demonstrated 
that only affective ToM ratings were negatively affected by injury severity, such that more 
severe injuries were associated with lower ratings for correct affective responses. This provides 
further indication that the process of inferring emotional states is distinct from cognitive 
inference and supports the simulation account of affective perspective-taking (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Kalbe et al., 2007).  
It is interesting to note that no relationship was observed between injury severity and 
incorrect affective ratings; these findings are interpreted as reflecting the “biasing” nature of 
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somatic marker cues. According to Bechara and colleagues (2000), the vmPFC marks 
advantageous or appropriate response options (in this case, the correct affective states) with 
physiological cues to bias behaviour. It could be argued, therefore, that participants in the current 
study who reported having sustained more severe injuries did not receive these biasing signals 
during the PTT and, consequently, were unable to distinguish correct responses from incorrect 
distractors (i.e., they may have rated correct responses as lower or more neutral). In contrast, 
those who reported no history of MHI are thought to have received these biasing signals, 
allowing them to discriminate and accurately rate correct responses as higher.  
Although the novel PTT designed for the purpose of this study did reveal differences in 
ToM reasoning as a function of MHI severity, it did not detect subtle variations in mentalizing 
following repeated SIE. Part of the reason for this may be the limited sensitivity of the PTT to 
detect subtle neurological disruption. That is, these findings cannot be taken as evidence that 
subconcussions have no socioemotional effects. Indeed, behavioural and affective outcomes have 
been found to exhibit a much lower injury-dysfunction threshold for impairment following 
repeated subconcussion compared to cognitive outcomes (Montenigro et al., 2016) and pre- to 
post-season cognitive impairments have been observed as a function of repeated SIE (e.g., 
Talavage et al., 2014). Moreover, given that all participants in the current study are 
asymptomatic university students, they may be more able to compensate for affective 
impairments; a more precise assessment of ToM deficits in this population may therefore require 
engagement of more subtle, implicit ToM reasoning. For example, increasing the uncertainty or 
ambiguity of characters’ mental states by having participants engage in live scenarios could be 
an alternative approach. Indeed, behavioural observations from researchers noted that 
participants often engaged in behaviours throughout the testing sessions that were indicative of 
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poor ToM; thus, paradigms that are able to effectively capture subtle variations in ToM in 
everyday life may be more sensitive to the effects of subconcussion.  
The final objective of this research was to examine physiological arousal as a potential 
mechanism of affective ToM impairment after MHI and repeated SIE. Based on the assumption 
that affective ToM and cognitive ToM engage different regions of the PFC, individuals with 
greater SIE or a history of MHI were expected to show reduced physiological arousal with 
respect to affective, not cognitive, PTT scenarios and this underarousal was expected to explain 
affective ToM performance. Interestingly, a relationship between performance and physiological 
arousal during affective ToM scenarios was found; however, this link was only demonstrated in 
those with a history of MHI. That is, for those who acknowledged a prior MHI, lower 
physiological arousal was associated with impaired performance (i.e., less differentiation 
between correct and incorrect affective responses). Importantly, these results are consistent with 
the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) and indicate that there is an optimal level of 
arousal for optimal performance on affective ToM tasks. Arousal levels that are too low, as 
observed in the MHI group, may limit one’s ability to generate somatic cues to appropriately 
judge another’s emotional state, resulting in less differentiation among correct and incorrect 
responses. In contrast, for those without a history of MHI, EDA during affective scenarios does 
not predict affective ToM performance. Although this implies that a certain threshold of arousal 
must be met for optimal performance, the results also indicate that increases in arousal beyond 
this threshold (e.g., as in the normative population), do not lead to “more” somatic cues and 
better affective ToM. Taken together, these results provide further evidence that physiological 
arousal serves as the mechanism for the affective component of ToM, such that physiological 
dysregulation following MHI disrupts simulation and lead to impairments in inferring others 
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emotional states. 
Limitations 
The current study is limited in generalizability as participants consisted exclusively of 
university students. As a result, these students may represent a more resilient group of head-
injured individuals, as they were able to overcome the challenges associated with their injuries 
and continue on with post-secondary studies; those who were unable to pursue higher education 
as a result of these challenges are not represented in the current sample. In addition, although it 
has been suggested that there are sex differences in affective reasoning (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003; Turkstra, 2008), the disproportionate 
number of males and females in the MHI groups prohibited comparisons between the sexes in 
the current sample. Consequently, it could be argued that the observed differences in affective 
ToM performance are due to the large proportion of males in the head injury group; however, the 
current findings showed a gradient of affective ToM impairment as a function of injury severity 
(e.g., males with more severe injuries showed greater impairments than males with less severe 
injuries) and are consistent with similar research on MHI (e.g., Sharan & Good, 2014). Further 
research examining whether there are observable sex differences in brain activity during ToM 
tasks is lacking (Carrington & Bailey, 2009); thus, it cannot be determined whether ToM 
reasoning across the sexes relies on different processes.  
The assessment of head injury status and athletic history (which was used to develop the 
SIE composite) using retrospective self-report may be considered a limitation in the absence of 
corroborating information. However, given the mild nature of these injuries, substantiating 
evidence is often limited. Indeed, previous research in the NCR lab has shown that the majority 
of those who acknowledge a history of MHI do not receive medical assistance for their injuries 
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(e.g., Baker & Good, 2014; van Noordt & Good, 2011). Indeed, only half of participants in the 
current study who reported a prior MHI received medical attention. The asymptomatic nature of 
subconcussive trauma poses a greater challenge in terms of assessment, as corroborating sources 
do not exist outside of helmeted telemetry. The inclusion of physiological indices in this study 
may therefore, present a reliable indicator of the cumulative effects of subconcussions.  
It is acknowledged that causal conclusions cannot be drawn from this cross-sectional 
research as it is unknown whether athletes exhibited lower baseline levels of physiological 
arousal prior to any impact exposure or head injury. While the possibility that the observed 
differences in physiological arousal are due to personality characteristics (i.e., those who choose 
to engage in high-risk sports were already underaroused and more attracted to athletics as a 
means of boosting arousal; e.g., Barratt, 1985) remains, previous research in the NCR lab has 
demonstrated that SIE predicts risk-taking and thrill-seeking behaviour, over and above athletic 
status (Gallant & Good, 2017). Further, similar findings have been observed in previous studies 
on MHI that were not limited to athletic participants (e.g., Baker & Good, 2014; van Noordt & 
Good, 2011).  
Conclusions 
The findings from this cross-sectional study have illustrated that a history of 
subconcussive exposure is negatively associated with physiological arousal in university students 
and have provided further indication that even subtle disruption to the vmPFC can alter 
autonomic function. Although the physiological changes observed following SIE were not linked 
to affective ToM performance, this underarousal implies that accumulated subconcussion is 
associated with a reduced capacity for vigilance to environmental and internal cues. The ToM 
assessment employed in the current study, therefore, may not be sensitive enough to capture 
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subtle differences in ToM performance as a result of asymptomatic injury.  
Nonetheless, this study demonstrated subtle deficits in affective ToM processes as a 
result of mild forms of head injury and along the continuum of injury severity; these deficits 
corresponded to changes in autonomic activation, providing evidence for the simulation account 
of ToM reasoning. In particular, injury severity was found to significantly predict affective ToM 
ratings, such that those with more severe head injuries were less able to distinguish between the 
correct affective state of a target and incorrect distractors (i.e., they did not rate the correct 
responses as high [e.g., 6 or 7 on a 7-point Likert scale] and incorrect responses as low [e.g., 1 or 
2] as their no-MHI peers). Although physiological arousal was not found to mediate the 
relationship between injury severity and affective ToM ratings, the results partially support the 
simulation account of affective ToM and the proposed role of the vmPFC in this process. 
Consistent with the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio, 1994), those 
with a history of MHI were found to be physiologically underaroused and this was predictive of 
impairments in inferring others’ emotional, but not cognitive, states. Overall, these preliminary 
results indicate that university students with a history of at least one MHI can experience subtle 
alterations in social and emotional functioning. 
From a clinical standpoint, the inability to make inferences about others’ mental states is 
an important consideration in developing appropriate interventions following TBI. In fact, 
clinicians are often instructed to refrain from abstract communication, analogies, and indirect 
speech to limit the social inference demands placed on patients (Jackson & Hague, 2013). 
Similarly, studies indicate that impaired ToM has a profound impact on the friends and families 
of those afflicted, and not surprisingly perhaps, is a significant predictor of caregivers’ health-
related quality of life (Bivona et al., 2015). Individuals living with a TBI are often unaware of 
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how their behaviour influences others and consistently fail to consider others’ viewpoints. For 
instance, in contrast to their non-injured spouses, individuals with brain injuries report 
significantly higher marriage satisfaction (Oddy, 1999), and are often described as self-centred 
by their spouses. Successful mentalizing facilitates social exchanges and preserves personal 
relationships (e.g., Fink et al., 2015). Taken together, the inability to see the world from 
another’s perspective is a major obstacle following TBI of all severities and the source of many 
interpersonal, vocational, and rehabilitation challenges.  
Despite these profound implications, the ability to adopt another’s perspective has not 
been directly studied in athletic populations and socioemotional outcomes have been relatively 
neglected in the subconcussion literature. This thesis aims to bridge this gap and investigate 
lifetime SIE and socioemotional sequelae in athletes. Given the case selection bias in CTE 
research, and the extensive reliance on recall information from family members, there is a need 
for more sensitive indices of emotional and behavioural outcomes following repeated SIE. The 
assessment of EDA may be a sensitive approach to detecting subtle impairments following 
subconcussive trauma; future investigations should include physiological indices to develop a 
greater understanding of the neurodegenerative process and CTE progression. Moreover, this 
line of research may highlight potential physiological interventions to improve affective ToM 
and, more broadly, social skills following head injury. 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
 
Investigating Individual Differences, Personality, and Emotions in Student Athletes and Non-Athletes 
 
Principal Student Investigator:    Principal Investigator: 
Caitlyn Gallant, B.A., M.A. Candidate   Dr. Dawn Good, Ph.D., C. Psych. 
Psychology Department     Psychology Department & Centre for Neuroscience 
Brock University      Brock University 
St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1     St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1 
cg14xx@brocku.ca       dawn.good@brocku.ca   
(905) 688-5550 x 3034     (905) 688-5550 x 3556, 3869  
 
INVITATION 
 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is examine individual 
differences between athletes and non-athletes. 
 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
 
Participation will take approximately 2 hours of your time and will be completed within one session. All participants 
will be tested individually. As a participant in this study we will ask you to be involved in providing us with 
physiological measures (i.e., measures of heart rate, respiration, blood pressure and skin conductance [sweat 
response]) and self-report measures (i.e., questionnaires related to demographics [e.g., sex, age, medical history, 
lifestyle] of personality and cognition). You will also be asked to complete two performance-based computerized 
tests and two cognitively demanding pencil and paper tasks. Detailed instructions will be provided to you throughout 
the testing session.  
 
Prior to and during one of the performance-based computerized tests we will collect physiological measures (i.e., 
one baseline measure and throughout the task), which will be recorded via electrodes and other recording 
equipment. The application of the recording equipment will be described to you during the application process and 
the researcher will role-model the placing of the two electrodes on your fingers for skin conductance, as well as a 
pulse oximeter, to measure heart rate, a blood pressure cuff on your upper arm, and respiration bands on your 
abdomen and chest. The researcher will wear gloves during this procedure should you request any assistance with 
the equipment. You will be provided cleansing pads for your hands and fingers prior to, and after, electrode 
placement. In order to reduce physical contact between yourself and the researcher you will be asked to complete the 
placement and adjustment of the physiological recording equipment independently.  
 
You will also be asked to complete various questionnaires and assessments. You will be asked to provide 
background information about yourself such as sex, age, and level of education. As a result, you may find some of 
the questions to be personal or sensitive in nature, and you may choose to omit any question you prefer not to 
answer. Once you have completed the research package, the researcher will explain further details regarding the 
specific purposes of the study to you and you will be provided with a debriefing form. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty 
or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. If you choose to withdraw at any time please verbally inform the 
researcher; should you decide at completion of the study that you would like to withdraw your data from the study, 
please contact the Principal Investigator and advise her of this. Note that should you choose to withdraw 
participation credit will be allocated commensurate with length of participation.  
 
All information obtained in this study will be kept strictly confidential. All data will be coded with an alphanumeric 
code so that no data will have your personal identification associated with it. However, there will be a master list 
advising the Principal Researchers (Dr. Dawn Good, Caitlyn Gallant, M.A. Candidate) of each participants’ identity 
so that we can correctly match your data across the various tests and multiple sources of collection (i.e., computer 
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collected physiological measures, paper-based task performance). This restricted access list will be held in a 
separate, secure and locked location. Further, the results of the study will be presented in a statistical format and as a 
group - no individual participant information will be published or identified. The information you provide (your 
data, answers, with only an alphanumeric code identifier) will be kept locked in a secure location for ten years, to 
which only researchers and research assistants have access. Data will be subsequently destroyed (shredded or 
electronically deleted). If you choose to withdraw from the study prior to completion, your data will not be used in 
the analyses and will be destroyed. The Brock researcher will only use data for research purposes; that said, for the 
health-related information only, the data you provide will only be accessible or provided to another resource (e.g., 
sports league, health professional), if directed by you through your explicit and formal request and/or consent (in 
this event an additional consent form that is consistent with the guidelines of PHIPA [2004] for release of 
information would be required and signed by you).  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS  
 
A potential risk of the current study is if you have an unknown allergy to the conductive gel used to measure skin 
conductance. If this is the case, you will immediately be provided sanitary wipes and antibacterial lotion (otherwise, 
you will use this upon removal of the electrodes at the end of the testing). You may also feel challenged, 
embarrassed or disquieted, when completing neuropsychological measures (reading/responding to sensitive 
questions, completing tasks that are cognitively demanding); however, know that the tests do not reflect your 
intellectual capacity and are intentionally challenging. Individual performance and scores will not be included in any 
analyses. Finally, should you experience any concerns or emotional responses that arise as a result of your 
participation in this research study, you will be provided with contact information (e.g., counselling) at the end of 
the testing session. Your performance, responses, experience and concerns will remain confidential. Should there be 
any concerns about blood pressure or responses that require further addressing, the Principal Investigator will 
contact you directly and advise you of such, while respecting confidentiality and privacy as dictated by the Personal 
Health Information Protection Act, PHIPPA, legislation (e.g., https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/04p03).  
 
You will receive a detailed debriefing form about the study at the end of testing. You may receive course credit 
compensation for your participation. Also, you may contact the researchers via e-mail if you wish to view the results 
of the study.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Your name will be associated only with this consent form. All information collected will be confidential and kept 
separately from this consent form, and coded by an alpha-numeric code assignment. As noted above, a master list 
will be kept linking data codes to individuals’ data and only Dr. Good and Caitlyn Gallant will have access to this 
master list. All task data and notes taken will be kept in a locked, secure lab at all times and will be destroyed after 
10 years. Only Caitlyn Gallant, Dr. Good, and their research assistants will have access to the data. All research 
assistants have completed confidentiality agreements. In addition, any information gathered from this study that is 
presented at conferences or is published is summarized and group results (rather than individuals) are emphasized 
which preserves anonymity.  
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
 
This study forms a research project associated with M.A. and undergraduate theses. Results of this study may be 
published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be available after 
April, 2017. Please contact the principal faculty or student investigators (Dr. Dawn Good or Caitlyn Gallant) via the 
contact information provided on this form if you wish to view the results of this study at that time via a copy of the 
final report, or a summary poster of this study. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Dr. Dawn Good or Caitlyn 
Gallant at Brock University using the contact information provided. This study has been reviewed and received 
clearance through the Brock University Research Ethics Board [#15-324]. If you have any comments or concerns 
about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca. 
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Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this consent form for your records. 
CONSENT FORM 
 
[  ] I have read the information presented about the current study being conducted by Dr. Dawn Good and Caitlyn 
Gallant investigating Individual Differences between Athletes and Non-Athletes  
[  ] I have read and understand the above information regarding this study. 
[  ] I have received a copy of this form. 
[  ] I understand that I may ask questions at any time during the study and in the future.  
[  ] I understand that I may withdraw from this study at any time. 
[  ] I agree to participate in this study.  
[  ] I give permission to be contacted regarding this study or future studies  
Name: ____________________________________________ Phone #: _________________________________ 
 
Signature: __________________________________________________ Date: ___________________________ 
 
 
 
Compensation: 
 
[  ] COURSE CREDIT to receive up to two research credits (two hours; 0.5 ever 30 minutes; please circle only one 
course): 
PSYC    1F90     2P12     2P20     2F23     2P36     2P37    3P39     Other: 
 
 
 
 
Researcher Signature: ________________________________________   Date: ___________________________ 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH! 
 
 
 
Principal Student Investigator:     Principal Investigator:  
Caitlyn Gallant, B.A., M.A. Candidate    Dr. Dawn Good, Ph.D., C. Psych  
Department of Psychology     Department of Psychology, Centre for Neuroscience  
Brock University      Brock University  
St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1     St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1  
cg14xx@brocku.ca       dawn.good@brocku.ca  
(905) 688-5550 x 3034     (905) 688-5550 x 3869  
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PARTICIPANT DEBRIEFING FORM 
Investigating Individual Differences, Personality and Emotions in Student Athletes and Non-athletes 
 
Caitlyn Gallant & Dr. Dawn Good 
Department of Psychology, Brock University 
Purpose and Background 
Thank you for your participation in this research study. This research was conducted by Dr. Dawn Good 
and Caitlyn Gallant, M.A. Candidate, in the Department of Psychology at Brock University. This study is 
investigating individual differences in socioemotional processing (i.e., theory of mind) between athletes 
and non-athletes who have, and have not, previously been exposed to repetitive subconcussive head 
impacts (low-level asymptomatic impacts sustained in sports) and/or experienced a previous mild head 
injury/concussion. We were unable to advise you of our added interest in subconcussion/concussion prior 
to your participation, since previous research has demonstrated that disclosing this factor can bias 
recruitment of participants and the reporting (or expression) of its respective symptoms (Suhr & Gunstad, 
2002). Numerous young adults incur head injuries every year and the majority of these injuries are mild in 
nature. Approximately 25 to 45 percent of university students have sustained a concussion (often through 
sports or falls), with a small proportion experiencing persistent symptoms after three months (the majority 
will have resolved fully within 3 weeks). Most effects of mild injuries to the head are temporary, and 
otherwise, subtle. As popularized by the press on sports injuries, some can be more permanent.  
 
While considerable research has examined the psychological and neuropsychological challenges in 
persons with moderate and severe injuries, very little work has investigated mild head injuries and 
repeated subconcussion exposure. 
 
It is our intention to understand the implications that repeated subconcussion may have on function 
(emotional, social), if any, and ultimately, optimize functioning for any person who is at a greater risk of 
repeatedly sustaining these low-level blows. Our research focuses specifically on better understanding 
theory of mind processing in individuals following self-reported subconcussive impact exposure. We are 
also attempting to determine whether the affective and cognitive subcomponents of theory of mind can be 
dissociated in terms of their underlying neural mechanisms. The results of this study have important 
implications for athletes in high-impact sports and could help to inform sports guidelines, prevention 
efforts, and rehabilitation strategies. Additionally, these results will contribute to literature on the social 
consequences of mild head injuries.  
 
FINAL REPORT 
Your participation is important for us to be able to examine group differences between persons who have 
experienced a MHI or have been exposed to repeated subconcussion and those who have not. University 
students are interesting to us because they represent a very competent group of individuals who have 
many substantive and goal-oriented skills that can compensate, support, protect and mask any challenges 
that may accompany an injury to the head. By identifying the individual differences in socioemotional 
processing amongst University students with varying levels of subconcussive impact exposure, we will 
gain a greater understanding of the factors contributing to the long-term outcomes associated with 
cumulative subconcussion and the mechanisms underlying this relationship. All of the data collected 
within this study will be in the form of aggregate data and averages and will not, in any way, reflect or 
indicate the performance of any single participant.  
 
To ensure confidentiality and privacy, individual names, while collected, are not associated with data or 
files used in this study, with the exception of a master list to which only the Principal Researchers have 
access. As a result, individual results cannot be provided. All data will be summarized and presented as a 
group in a thesis project, in publishable journals, and at conferences. You are invited to view the results at 
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the time of completion in August 2017. Should there be any need or request for health-related data to be 
released to another Regulated Health Professional or person of your preference, a “Consent to Release 
Personal Information” form would be required and would need to be explicitly requested by you. If you 
are interested in obtaining a copy of the final report, or a summary poster, of this study, contact the NCR 
lab at Brock University (905) 688-5550 ext. 3556, or 5523 - the lab offices of the primary investigator, 
Dr. Dawn Good [dawn.good@brocku.ca].  
 
Contact 
It is our intention to confirm with you that your experience in this study has been a rewarding one and you 
are thanked for your contribution to this research endeavor. However, if you had any negative experiences 
(e.g., reading/responding to sensitive questions, increased cognitive demands) as a result of participating 
in this research study, please contact either of the Principal Investigators (listed below). If wish to speak 
with a counsellor please contact: Brock University Counselling Services, Schmon Tower 400, (905) 688-
5550 extension 4750, http://www.brocku.ca/personal-counselling or the Principal Investigator, Dr. Dawn 
Good, Department of Psychology, B308 MC, extension 3869, dawn.good@brocku.ca. Community-based 
Mental Health Programs and Services in Niagara can be accessed via: 
www.Familysupportniagara.com/resources/Niagara-mental-health-programs-services-directory/: 
Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA) Niagara Branch – [905] 688-2543; Distract Centre Niagara 
– [905] 688-3711, your family physician or Brock’s Student Health Services [brocku.ca/health-services]. 
 
Your performance, responses, experience and concerns will remain confidential. Should there be any 
health- related concerns or responses (e.g., blood pressure, psychological health) that require further 
addressing, the Principal Investigator will contact you directly and advise you of such, while respecting 
confidentiality and privacy as dictated by the Personal Health Information Protection Act, PHIPPA, 
legislation (e.g., https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/04p03). You will also been encouraged to contact 
your family physician or Brock’s Student Health Services [brocku.ca/health-services] as additional 
resources.  
 
Should you like more information regarding head trauma, or its sequelae, please visit the following 
websites: The Ontario Brain Injury Association (OBIA): http://www.obia.ca/ , The Ontario Neurotrauma 
Foundation (ONF): http://www.onf.org/ or the Brain Injury Association of Niagara (BIAN): 
www.bianiagara.org). Should you wish directed assistance, OBIA is an educational and advocacy 
resource, and has inquiry help lines – [905] 641-8877. Should you have any further concerns, please 
contact your family doctor for additional information.  
 
This project has been reviewed and received clearance through the Brock University Research Ethics 
Board (#15-324). If you have any pertinent questions regarding your rights as a participant, or feel your 
rights have been violated, please contact the Research Ethics Officer via e-mail at reb@brocku.ca or you 
may call (905) 688-5550 extension 3035.  
 
Thank you again for your time and participating in this study! 
If you have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact us at the Brock University  
Neuropsychology Cognitive Research Lab: 
 
Principal Student Investigator:  Principal Investigator: 
Caitlyn Gallant, B.A., M.A. Candidate   Dr. Dawn Good, Ph.D., C. Psych 
Department of Psychology   Department of Psychology, Centre for Neuroscience 
Brock University    Brock University 
St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1   St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1 
cg14xx@brocku.ca     dawn.good@brocku.ca  
(905) 688-5550 x 3034    (905) 688-5550 x 3869 
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QUESTIONNAIRE OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE EMPATHY (QCAE) 
 
Using the 4-point scale shown, please indicate to what degree the following statements apply to 
you. (1= strongly agree 2= slightly agree 3= slightly disagree 4= strongly disagree) 
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.   
2. I am usually objective when I watch a film or play, and I don’t often get completely 
caught up in it.  
3. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.   
4. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.  
5. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
6. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I was in their place.  
7. I often get emotionally involved with my friends’ problems. 
8. I am inclined to get nervous when others around me seem nervous. 
9. People I am with have a strong influence on my mood. 
10. It affects me very much when one of my friends seems upset.  
11. I often get deeply involved with the feelings of a character in a film, play, or novel.  
12. I get very upset when I see someone cry. 
13. I am happy when I am with a cheerful group and sad when the others are glum.  
14. It worries me when others are worrying and panicky.  
15. I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation.  
16. I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another.  
17. It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much.  
18. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes.   
19. I am good at predicting how someone will feel.   
20. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.  
21. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they are 
thinking.  
22. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying.   
23. Friends talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very understanding.   
24. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person does not tell me.   
25. I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.  
26. I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion.  
27. I am good at predicting what someone will do.  
28. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I do not agree with it.   
29. I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film.  
30. I always try to consider the other fellow’s feelings before I do something. 
31. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it.  
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Everyday Living Questionnaire 
 
Please fill in or circle an answer for each of the following. If you have any questions 
regarding clarification please ask the researcher. Thank you for your time and effort! 
 
1. How old are you?  ____ 
 
2. Gender?     M___ F____ 
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have presently completed? 
a    Less than high school   
b.   High School/Grade 12 
c. College 1 2 3 4 4+ 
d. University 1 2 3 4 4+ (Years)  
 
4. What is the highest level of education your mother has received?  
a    Less than high school   
b.   High School/Grade 12 
c.    College 1 2 3 4 4+ 
d. University 1 2 3 4 4+ (Years)  
e.    Unsure 
 
5. What is the highest level of education your father has received?  
a    Less than high school   
b.   High School/Grade 12 
c.   College 1 2 3 4 4+ 
d.  University 1 2 3 4 4+ (Years) 
e.  Unsure 
 
6. What is the overall average income your parent(s)/guardian(s)? 
a. Under $25,000 
b. $25,000 – $49,999 
c. $50,000 – $74,999 
d. $75,000 - $99,999 
e. $100,000 – $124,999 
f. $125,000 - $149,999 
g. $150,000 or more 
 
7. With which ethnicity do you identify most with:  
a. Hispanic 
b. Caucasian 
c. European 
d. African 
e. Chinese 
f. East Indian 
g. West Indian 
h. Japanese 
i. Other    
             Specify: _____________ 
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8. Which faculty is your major affiliated with (e.g., Social Sciences, Humanities, etc.) 
a. Social Sciences 
b. Humanities 
c. Maths and Sciences 
d. Education 
e. Applied Health Sciences 
f. Business 
g. Undeclared  
  
9. Which hand is your dominant hand (i.e., are you right or left-handed)? 
a. Right 
b. Left  
c. Both 
 
10.  Have you ever been hospitalized for (circle any that apply):  
a. Fractures      Y       N 
b. Illness     Y       N 
c. Surgery      Y       N 
d. Neurological complications   Y       N 
e. Other     Y N 
 
If you answered Y to any of the above, briefly please provide details: 
e.g., How old were you?  How did it happen? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Have you ever been diagnosed with a neurological condition?    Y        N 
 
12. Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric condition?    Y        N 
 
13. Are you currently taking any prescribed medications for a neurological or psychiatric 
condition?          Y N     
 
a. If yes, if you wish to disclose what medication please do so: 
 
14. Are you currently taking any prescribed medication for a thyroid condition?    Y       N 
a. If yes, explain if you feel comfortable: ________________________ 
 
15. Are you currently taking any oral contraception?     Y N  N/A 
 
16. Do you take medication for asthma such as an inhaler?    Y N 
 
17. Have you ever sustained an injury to your head with a force sufficient to alter your 
consciousness (e.g. dizziness, vomiting, seeing stars, or loss of consciousness, or 
confusion)?            Y        N 
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[If you answered no to this question you may move ahead to question 30] 
If yes to question 17, please answer the following questions (if you have had more than one 
injury, please refer to the most recent time you injured your head):  
 
18. If you answered yes to question 17, did you experience these symptoms for more than 20 
minutes?           Y N 
 
19. Did you experience a loss of consciousness associated with the head injury?    Y       N 
 
i. If so, how long was the loss of consciousness? 
1. [   ]  < 5 minutes 
2. [   ]  < 30  minutes  
3. [   ]  < 24 hours 
4. [   ]  < 1 week 
5. [   ]  < 1 month 
6. [   ]  > 1 month 
 
20. If applicable, where did you strike your head? 
a. Front of the head 
b. Right side of the head 
c. Left side of the head 
d. Other   Provide brief details: ______________________________ 
e. I can’t remember 
 
21. How did you injure your head? 
i. [   ] Motor vehicle collision 
ii. [   ] Sports-related injury    Please specify sport(s): 
________________________________________________________ 
iii. [   ] Falling 
iv. [   ] Other     Please Specify:_________________________________ 
 
22. Please briefly describe the incident during which the head injury occurred:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
23.   Please answer the following questions:    
 
a. Did the head injury result in a concussion?       Y       N 
 
b. Did it require stitches?            Y       N 
 
c. Did you receive medical treatment for your injury?   Y      N 
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d. Did you stay overnight at a medical care facility?      Y      N 
 
e. Approximately how old were you at the time?  ___   
 
f. How many months or year(s) have passed since you hit your head? ___   
 
24. Have you sustained more than one injury to your head with a force sufficient to alter your 
consciousness (e.g., dizziness, vomiting, seeing stars, loss of consciousness, or 
confusion)?           Y        N 
 
a. If yes, how many times? ___   
[If you answered no to this question you may move ahead to question 31] 
 
25. If you answered yes to question 24, did you experience these symptoms for more than 
20 minutes?          Y N 
 
If you responded yes to question 24, please answer the following with respect to your least 
recent head injury:  
 
26. Did you experience a loss of consciousness associated with the least recent head injury?  
Y    N    
a. If so, how long was the loss of consciousness? 
i. [   ]  < 5 minutes 
ii. [   ]  < 30  minutes  
iii. [   ]  < 24 hours 
iv. [   ]  < 1 week 
v. [   ]  < 1 month 
vi. [   ]  > 1 month 
 
27. If applicable, where did you strike you head?  
a. Front of the head 
b. Back of the head 
c. Right side of the head 
d. Left side of the head 
e. Other   Provide brief details: ______________________________  
f. I can’t remember 
 
28. How did you injure your head? 
a. [   ] Motor vehicle collision 
b. [   ] Sports-related injury   Please specify sport(s): 
_______________________________________________________ 
c. [   ] Falling 
d. [   ] Other     Please specify:_________________________________ 
 
29. Please briefly describe the incident during which the least recent head injury occurred:    
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30.  Please answer the following questions:                                                                             
 
a. Did the head injury result in a concussion?        Y N 
 
b. Did it require stitches?            Y N 
 
c. Did you receive medical treatment for your injury?     Y N 
 
d. Did you stay overnight at a medical care facility?     Y N 
 
e. Approximately how old were you at the time?  ___   
 
f. How many months or year(s) have passed since you hit your head? ___  
 
g. Did the injury result in any litigation processes?    Y N 
 
********If you were instructed to move ahead to question 31 please begin here******** 
 
31. Have you ever been involved in a litigation process of any sort?   Y N 
 
32. Have you ever experienced any other neural trauma (e.g. stroke, anoxia)?   Y N 
a. If yes, please explain: 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Do you smoke cigarettes?       Y N 
 
If yes, approximately how many a day? ____  
 
34. Do you regularly engage in consuming alcohol?        Y        N 
 
a. If yes, how many drinks per week do you consume?    
b. On average how many drinks would you consume in one outing?  
 
35. Do you engage in recreational drug use?      Y N 
a. Do you smoke marijuana?       Y N 
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If yes to question 35 a., please answer the following. If no, please advance to question 36. 
 
  i. How long have you been smoking marijuana (months/years)? ________ 
 
ii. In your lifetime, how many instances have you smoked? 
  1. 0 
  2. 1-2 
  3. 2-10 
  4. 10-30 
  5. 30-50 
  6. 5-100 
  7. 100-300 
  8. 300+ 
iii. Please rate your marijuana use in the past 30 days. 
   1. No use 
   2. Once or twice 
   3. Weekly 
   4. Daily 
   
iv. Have you had symptoms in the past you believe were caused, aggravated, or 
ameliorated by marijuana smoking?     Y N  
If yes, please explain: __________________________________________ 
 
v. Have you had symptoms now you believe were caused or aggravated by 
marijuana use?           Y N  
If yes, please explain: __________________________________________ 
 
vi. What are your general motives for using marijuana? Select all that apply. 
  1. To deal with anxiety 
  2. To cope with pain 
  3. For pleasure 
4. Other. Explain: __________________________________________ 
 
********If you were instructed to move ahead to question 36 please begin here******** 
 
36. Do you take any performance enhancing drugs (e.g., ergogenic drugs such as anabolic 
steroids, hormones; stimulant drugs – other than caffeine-based products, see below – 
such as amphetamine, ephedrine)?         Y N 
 
37. Did you consume caffeine today (e.g., coffee, tea, energy drink, chocolate)?   Y    N 
 
a. If yes, how much? 
1         2          3        more than 3  
                     b.   If yes, how much time has past since you last consumed caffeine today?  
   
Less than 1 hour  More than 1 hour  
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38. Do you have sensitivity to perfumes or scents?      Y N 
If yes, please rate your sensitivity: 
     
            Not at all                         Very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
39.  Do you have a valid driver’s license?             Y N 
 
a. If yes, how long have you had a driver’s license? 1-3 years   4-6 years   7+ years    N/A 
 
40. Do you wear glasses or contacts?               Y N  
 
41. Do you live:     on your own          with roommates             other 
     
with parents/guardians    with partner 
 
42. How many university credits are you taking this semester? 
 
0    0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6    N/A 
 
43. On a scale of 1 to 9 rate your enjoyment of academics: 
 
Not at all                Very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
44. Have you ever received any extra assistance during your educational history?     Y        N 
 
Please circle any that apply and indicate when you received the assistance: 
E = Elementary school             H = High school         U = University 
 
a. Learning resource teacher     E H U 
b. Tutor       E H U 
c. Educational assistant     E H U 
d. Speech Language Pathologist    E H U 
e. Occupational Therapist     E H U 
f. Physical Therapist (Physiotherapist)   E H U 
g. Other: Please Specify: ____________________________ E         H U 
 
45. Have you ever been diagnosed or classified as having a Learning Disorder?        Y        N 
 
46. Do you consider yourself a musician?                   Y        N 
 
47. Have you ever considered yourself to be a musician?               Y         N  
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48. If you answered yes to either question 46 or 47, do/ did you play/perform: 
a. Professionally 
b. Recreationally 
N/A  
 
49. If you answered yes to either question 46 or 47, how long do/ did you play/perform for? 
N/A ______________ 
 
50. If you answered yes to either question 46 or 47, what age did you start 
playing/performing at? N/A  _____________ years 
 
51. How often do you listen to music? ____________ hours per week  
 
52. Please indicate the type of music you listen to most often? 
a. Country 
b. Classical 
c. Rock 
d. R & B 
e. Blues 
f. Independent (Indie) 
g. Jazz 
h. Pop 
i. Electronic (house/dance) 
j. Folk 
k. Opera 
l. Acoustic/ soft rock 
m. Other:   Provide brief details: ______________________________ 
 
53. On a scale of 1 to 9, please rate your enjoyment of your life situation: 
 
Not at all               Very 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
54. On a scale of 1 to 9, how stressful would you rate your day-to-day life? 
 
Not at all               Very 
1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 
55. What extracurricular sport(s) do/ did you play in: 
 
a. Elementary/ middle school:  
i. Please describe/ name the sport(s) AND indicate if it was recreational 
(R) or competitive (C) for each sport listed. 
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ii. How often did you play sports (per week)? 
iii. For each sport listed above, please indicate the last time you played each 
(e.g., indicate how long ago you played elementary school soccer).  
 
iv. For each sport listed above, please rank them in order from your 
favourite (most amount of time playing) to your least favourite (least 
amount of time playing). 
 
 
b. High school:  
i. Please describe/name the sport(s) AND indicate if it was recreational (R) 
or competitive (C) for each sport listed. 
 
   
ii. How often did you play sports (per week)? 
iii. For each sport listed above, please indicate the last time you played each 
(e.g. indicate how long ago you played high school soccer). 
 
 
iv. For each sport listed above, please rank them in order from your favourite 
(most amount of time playing) to your least favourite (least amount of 
time playing). 
 
 
c. University:   
i. Please describe/name the sport(s) AND indicate if it was/is recreational 
(R) or competitive (C) for each sport listed. 
 
 
ii. How often do/did you play sports (per week)? 
iii. For each sport listed above, please indicate the last time you played each 
(e.g. indicate how long ago you played university soccer, if still play 
indicate “currently play”). 
 
 
 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 144 
iv. For each sport listed above, please rank them in order from your 
favourite (most amount of time playing) to your least favourite (least 
amount of time playing). 
 
 
   
v. For your favourite sport ranked above, please indicate the primary 
position that you play/played.  
 
vi. For your favourite sport ranked above, please indicate the average 
percentage of time that you play/played each game? (e.g., 50%, 80%, 
etc.) 
 
 
56.  Do you exercise regularly?       Y N 
 
a. If yes, how many times a week do you exercise? _____ 
Please describe: _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
57.  When you ride a bike/skate/etc. do you wear a helmet?      Y  N        N/A 
 
58.  Do you regularly engage in relaxation techniques (e.g., deep breathing or yoga):   Y     N 
a. If yes, how many times a week do you engage in relaxation methods? ______ 
Please describe: _________________________________________________________ 
  
59. Was last night’s sleep typical for you?        Y N 
If No, what was different (better, worse)?   ___________________________________ 
Why was it different (stress, room temperature, noise, etc.)? 
________________________________________________________________             
60. Please indicate how well you slept last night by circling a number: 
Worst possible sleep                                                                                 Best possible 
sleep 
         1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7  
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61. Please indicate how you feel right now by circling a number: 
 
Very sleepy                                                                                                             Very alert 
       1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7  
 
62. Are you a shift worker?         Y N 
 
63. Have you had anything out of the ordinary occur in the past day or so?    Y  N 
 If yes, please explain: 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
64. Circle any of the following that apply to your experience over the past 6 months: 
 
Moved       Death of a family member  
 
New Job      Death of a close friend  
 
Loss of Job      Financial Difficulties 
 
Loss of Relationship     Illness of someone close to you 
 
New Relationship     Personal Illness/Injury   
 
Reconciliation with partner    New Baby  
 
Reconciliation with Family    Wedding/ Engagement (self) 
 
Divorce (of self or parents)    Vacation  
 
Entered 1st year at university    Disrupted Sleep 
 
65. Please indicate how your day has been so far by circling a number: 
         
       Calm  1     2     3     4     5     6     7  8    9    10 Busy       
     Pleasant  1     2     3     4     5     6     7  8    9    10 Unpleasant 
NOT Stressful  1     2     3     4     5     6     7    8    9    10 VERY Stressful 
 
 
 
Question 64 format adapted from Holmes, T. & Rahe, R (1967). “Holmes-Rahe life changes 
scale”. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, Vol. 11, 213-218.   
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66. Please rate each of the following symptoms based on how you may have been affected 
during the past 2 months according to the following scale.  
 
FREQUENCY 
1 = Not at all 
2 = Seldom 
3 = Often 
4 = Very Often 
5 = All of the time 
INTENSITY 
1 = Not at all 
2 = Seldom 
3 = Clearly Present 
4 = Interfering 
5 = Crippling 
DURATION 
1 = Not at all 
2 = A Few Seconds 
3 = A Few Minutes 
4 = A Few Hours 
5 = Constant 
 
 FREQUENCY INTENSITY DURATION 
Headache    
Dizziness    
Irritability    
Memory Problems    
Difficulty 
Concentrating 
   
Fatigue    
Visual Disturbance    
Aggravated by Noise     
Judgment Problems    
Anxiety    
 
Question 66 from Gouvier et al. (1992) 
  
Thank you for your time and consideration in completing this questionnaire! J 
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INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate number 
that corresponds to the scale at the top of the page: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. When you have decided on 
your answer, circle the number next to the corresponding item. READ EACH ITEM 
CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank you.  
Answer Scale:  
 0 1 2 3 4 
Does not 
describe me 
well 
   Describes me 
very well 
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about 
things that might happen to me. 0  1  2  3  4  
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me. 0  1  2  3  4  
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the 
"other guy's" point of view. 0  1  2  3  4  
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people 
when they are having problems. 0  1  2  3  4  
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters 
in a novel. 0  1  2  3  4  
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-
ease. 0  1  2  3  4  
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, 
and I don't often get completely caught up in it. 0  1  2  3  4  
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement 
before I make a decision. 0  1  2  3  4  
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel 
kind of protective towards them. 0  1  2  3  4  
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of 
a very emotional situation. 0  1  2  3  4  
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective. 0  1  2  3  4  
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or 
movie is somewhat rare for me. 0  1  2  3  4  
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13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 0  1  2  3  4  
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me 
a great deal. 0  1  2  3  4  
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste 
much time listening to other people's arguments. 0  1  2  3  4  
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I 
were one of the characters. 0  1  2  3  4  
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 0  1  2  3  4  
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I 
sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. 0  1  2  3  4  
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with 
emergencies. 0  1  2  3  4  
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 0  1  2  3  4  
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question 
and try to look at them both. 0  1  2  3  4  
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted 
person. 0  1  2  3  4  
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put 
myself in the place of a leading character. 0  1  2  3  4  
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 0  1  2  3  4  
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put 
myself in his shoes" for a while. 0  1  2  3  4  
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I 
imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were 
happening to me. 
0  1  2  3  4  
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an 
emergency, I go to pieces. 0  1  2  3  4  
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I 
would feel if I were in their place. 0  1  2  3  4  
 
  
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 149 
READING THE MIND IN THE EYES TEST (Sample Images) 
 
For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the picture 
is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but please choose just 
one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before making your choice, make 
sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the task as quickly as possible but you 
will not be timed. If you really don’t know what a word means you can look it up in the 
definition handout.  
 
 
 
 
 
THEORY OF MIND FOLLOWING REPEATED SUBCONCUSSION 
 150 
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING TASK 
 
 During this task, you will be presented with a series of scenarios. One scenario will be 
presented at a time. After you have read the scenario, you will then click “Show Statement” to 
view the first corresponding statement. Consider each statement in reference to the scenario and 
rate the likelihood that the statement is plausible. Several statements will be presented for each 
scenario, until a new scenario appears. Please read all scenarios carefully and focus on what the 
characters are thinking or feeling. 
 
You will make a selection by clicking on one of the ratings on the scale below. Once you have 
selected and submitted your rating, the program will advance to the next to-be-rated statement. 
After four statements, you will be invited to progress to the next scenario.  
 
Response options: 
Very 
Unlikely 
  
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neutral Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Jason has just shoplifted and is making his getaway. As he is running away, a security guard 
sees him drop his student card. He wants to tell Jason he dropped his student card. When the 
security guard shouts out to Jason, “Hey, you! Stop!” Jason turns around, sees the security guard 
and gives himself up.  
 
 Jason gives himself up because:  
 
a) he has decided that he was wrong to shoplift. 
b) he thinks the security guard knows that he shoplifted.  
c) he is protecting his friend who ran the other way.  
d) he has determined that he cannot outrun the security guard. 
 
2. Sarah has been planning her sixteenth birthday party for weeks. During the weeks leading up 
to the party, Sarah subtly hints to her parents that she wants a new iPhone as a gift. She does so 
by pointing out the iPhone to them at the store several times. Oblivious to these hints, Sarah’s 
parents decide to get her tickets to an upcoming concert.  After opening the gift on her birthday, 
Sarah is surprised. She then refuses to engage in the party and becomes hostile towards her 
parents.  
 
Sarah is hostile towards her parents because: 
 
a) she thinks that her parents disregarded her hints and bought her the tickets instead.  
b) she thinks her parents do not understand her taste in concerts.  
c) she thinks they are embarrassing her in front of her friends.  
d) she thinks they didn’t notice her subtle hints in the previous weeks. 
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3. Tanya is giving a presentation to her class on the benefits of exercise. The presentation is part 
of a course that seeks to explore the relationship between physical health, societal factors, and 
psychological variables. Edward, who is watching the presentation, has a psychology 
background. Tanya provides a thorough description of how exercise helps cardiovascular 
function, blood flow and improves social relationships. At the end of the presentation, Edward 
raises his hand and asks Tanya if she could talk about the effects of exercise on mood.    
 
Edward asks Tanya about the effects of exercise on mood because: 
 
a) he thinks he might be depressed.  
b) he is trying to make her look bad by pointing out that she missed a topic in her presentation. 
c) he is interested in learning about how exercise might relate to what he has learned in his 
previous courses.  
d) he thinks he will receive extra marks for participation by contributing to the course discussion.  
 
4. Bernice is out with her friends having some casual drinks. While she is sitting at the bar, she 
sees a guy who keeps looking at her from across the room. As she continues drinking with her 
friends, she notices that the guy and his friends have moved from the table they were sitting at 
and they are approaching the bar. The guy decides to take a seat beside Bernice, in order to get a 
better view of the hockey game on the television screen behind the bar. As the guy sits down, 
Bernice goes to sit on another stool at the opposite end of the bar. 
 
Bernice decides to switch seats because: 
 
a) she wanted to let the guy sit with his friends to get a better view of the game.  
b) she is not getting served at that end of the bar.  
c) she thinks the guy is going to drink a lot beside her.  
d) she thinks that the guy is interested in her.   
5. James and Teagan are university students who work at a community centre on weekends. 
They work with youth, organizing sports activities to build confidence and self-esteem. One day, 
the youth group decides to play a pickup game of soccer. After playing for 30 minutes, Teagan 
shouts, “Next goal wins!” James is playing goalie for his team and he hasn’t let a goal in yet. 
Suddenly, Teagan passes the ball to Alanna, a 9-year-old girl. Alanna has a clear shot on James’ 
net. After a few minutes of stumbling with the ball, she shoots, and James dives to the side to 
save it. Teagan looks at James and rolls her eyes.  
Teagan rolls her eyes at James because: 
a) she thinks he just ruined the chances of her team winning.  
b) she thinks he should have let Alanna score. 
c) she can’t believe that Alanna missed that shot. 
d) she thinks her team is not very good at soccer.  
 
6. Jonathan has travelled three hours to visit his best friend Katie. Jonathan enjoys spending time 
with Katie but recognizes that she can be overly sensitive sometimes. As they are chatting over 
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dinner, Katie pulls out a photo from her pocket and explains to Jonathan that she is getting a 
tattoo next week. Jonathan looks at the design and thinks that it is ugly. When Katie asks, “What 
do you think?” Jonathan replies, “I thought you were trying to save your money so we could go 
to that concert together.” 
Jonathan reminds Katie of the concert because: 
a) he thinks she forgot about it and how soon it is.  
b) he wants to make sure that she has enough money for the concert.  
c) he does not like tattoos and is trying to change the subject of the conversation. 
d) he is trying to convince her not to get the tattoo without telling her that it is ugly. 
 
7. Tina has recently decided to try weight training at her local gym. As someone with little gym 
experience, she is nervous to start training in a public setting. When she first arrives at the gym it 
is quite busy. She recognizes two students from her Business class, Rob and Tom, and decides to 
use the bench in front of them to try a few exercises she read about.  Rob and Tom are regulars at 
the gym and are using the squat racks as they typically do while Tina is struggling to master her 
new routine. Suddenly, Tom bumps his head on the squat rack bar and he and Rob burst out 
laughing. Tina can hear them laughing behind her, looks around, and decides to stop using her 
weights and switch to the treadmill.  
Tina switches to the treadmill because: 
 
a) she realizes that weight training is much more difficult than she originally thought it would be. 
b) she thinks that Tom and Rob are immature and doesn’t want to work out near them. 
c) she thinks they are laughing at her because she is new to weight training.  
d) she thinks they are going to be noisy and disrupt her workout.  
 
8. Harry has plans to attend a house party at a friend’s place. Before he leaves, his parents ask 
him to watch over his younger sister Claire at the party. Given that he is a protective big brother 
he agrees to do so. When Harry arrives at the party, he notices that Steve and Claire are sitting 
closely together on the couch. He also sees Steve offer a beer to Claire. As the evening 
progresses, Harry decides to go outside to get some fresh air and notices Steve throwing up 
behind a bush. When Harry returns to the party, Claire approaches him and asks if he knows 
where Steve is. Harry tells her that he just saw Steve with another girl.  
 
Harry tells this to Claire because: 
 
a) he wants to get back at Claire for having to spend his time babysitting her at a party. 
b) he thinks that Steve isn’t a good choice for his sister and doesn’t want her to date him. 
c) he has had too much to drink and confused Steve with someone else at the party.   
d) he is trying to make his sister mad so his parents won’t send him to parties with her anymore.  
 
9. Krystal is driving away from Sandra’s house when Sandra’s dog suddenly runs into the road. 
She hits the brakes and swerves to the side, but feels her car go over something. Krystal stops 
and checks to see whether she has run over something. She finds that she ran over a bump in the 
road, and that everyone is safe.  
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As Krystal walks back to her car she feels: 
 
a) relieved because she did not run over Sandra’s dog.  
b) anxious because she had to hit the brakes quickly and swerve her car.  
c) angry because of the road conditions.   
d) upset because Sandra’s dog is not on a leash.  
 
10. In a university statistics class a professor is returning grades from a recent midterm exam. In 
the weeks leading up to the exam, Cheryl studied for 3 hours each day. She also took time to 
attend the professor’s office hours and received positive feedback about her knowledge of the 
topics. When Cheryl receives her mark she realizes that she received a grade equal to the class 
average and that most of her errors are due to formatting and rounding mistakes.  
 
After receiving this news, Cheryl feels: 
 
a) relieved that she has earned a grade similar to her peers. 
b) accomplished having completed the exam. 
c) disappointed that her performance on the test does not accurately reflect her knowledge. 
d) angry that the teacher misled her.  
 
11. Chase has a new car that he spends each Friday afternoon polishing and waxing. He has just 
finished doing so when his brother, Landon, pulls up to the house with his friends. They all start 
to discuss the hockey game that occurred earlier that day on campus. Landon begins reenacting 
one of the plays. He puts his cold soft drink can on the hood of Chase’s car and uses his hands to 
simulate one of the hits. Chase focuses on the ring of condensation that the drink is making on 
hood of his car.  
 
As Chase listens to the story, he feels: 
 
a) annoyed that Landon’s drink is making a mark on his newly waxed car. 
b) angry that Landon is trying to ruin his stuff. 
c) bored because he is not interested in hockey. 
d) accomplished having finished waxing his car.  
 
12. Five friends have a group message on Facebook where they can all communicate and view 
messages from one another. In this message, Tanner writes that he is having a New Year’s Eve 
party that everyone is invited to. Tanner discusses what he has planned and how fun the night is 
going to be. Everyone responds and confirms their attendance. A few weeks later, Jade writes in 
the message that there is another New Year’s Eve party going on at Christie’s place and that they 
should all consider going. Other members of the message post that they are unsure as to which 
party to they want to attend now. 
 
Reading all of this, Tanner feels: 
 
a) anxious about attending Christie’s party.   
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b) insulted that his friends are discussing attending another party other than his. 
c) excited because Christie’s party sounds fun. 
d) relieved that he no longer has to host a party.  
 
13. Vicky is at a party with her boyfriend Tommy. Her and Tommy are talking when an 
unfamiliar girl approaches. The girl is one of Tommy’s classmates that his teacher has asked him 
to tutor. The girl turns to Tommy, puts a hand on his shoulder and says, “Thanks for your help 
the other day.” After the girl leaves, Vicky turns to Tommy and says “Seems like someone has 
been making friends.”  
 
Vicky says this because she feels: 
 
a) relieved Tommy has been making friends 
b) annoyed that Tommy is wasting his time tutoring. 
c) jealous that Tommy is spending time with another girl. 
d) confused as to how Tommy would know anyone at the party. 
 
14. Cody and Melanie have been on two dates together. They met at a fundraising event a month 
ago and have been messaging each other on Facebook ever since. Cody is excited about asking 
Melanie to his sister’s wedding next month and hopes that she will agree to attend. He decides to 
message her about the wedding one evening. Three days later, he hasn’t received a response yet 
but notices that Melanie read the message two days ago. A couple hours later, Cody checks his 
Facebook messages once again and still sees no response. 
 
As Cody notices that Melanie still hasn’t responded he feels: 
 
a) angry that Melanie hasn’t responded despite seeing the message. 
b) anxious that Melanie hasn’t responded because she doesn’t want to go.  
c) happy that Melanie has received his message and will respond soon.  
d) annoyed that Melanie is wasting his time when he could be finding another date.  
 
15. Danny is a huge fan of a television show on HBO, which is based on a book series. Danny 
has read all of the books and typically knows what will occur in the show. However, the show 
often has exciting twists and adds new scenes. Unfortunately, given his work schedule, Danny 
can only watch the show on Tuesdays, two days after it premieres. One Monday, after the show 
had already aired, Danny receives a text from his friend saying, “I can’t believe they killed off 
the main character!” 
 
After receiving this news Danny feels: 
a) angry because his friend spoiled the show for him. 
b) excited because he already knew what was going to happen.  
c) confused because he thought that the main character was going to die later in the season.  
d) anxious because he hasn’t watched the episode yet.   
 
16. Jane is an Art Major who just accepted a summer job at a retirement home. She is used to 
working at an art school for gifted children in her hometown, but given that she is away at 
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university, she has decided to take this new position instead. Her supervisor has asked her to 
create a series of instructional workshops for the residents, using basic art techniques that they 
can grasp. Jane finds that this is below her level of expertise, decides to disregard these 
instructions and teach them more complex techniques that she prefers to use. After the first 
workshop, she receives anonymous evaluations from the residents. One of the forms states, “I 
didn’t learn much from this workshop, I think the instructor needs more experience.” 
 
When Jane reads this evaluation she feels: 
 
a) insulted that those with less experience than her are criticizing her expertise. 
b) confused as to why the resident didn’t learn much from the workshop. 
c) upset that her efforts were not appreciated by the residents.  
d) determined to do better the next time she organizes a workshop for the residents.  
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